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PROVING CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN VESSEL
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS: AN
ALLISION-OIL SPILL CASE STUDY
Craig H. Allen*
I. INTRODUCTION
Maritime policy analysts often invoke the "vessel safety net"
metaphor to explain the independent, but overlapping, risk
management roles and responsibilities of the vessel master and
crew, owner and charterer, operating company, classification
society, flag state and port states. Oil spills from the 2002 M/T
Prestige break up off the coast of Galicia, Spain, the 2007 M/V
Cosco Busan bridge allision in San Francisco Bay and the 2010
Deepwater Horizon debacle in the Gulf of Mexico, among others,
demonstrate that any or all of the components of that safety net
may come under scrutiny following a marine casualty, possibly
leading to civil and even criminal liability.
In response to the 2002 M/T Prestige spill, for example, the
government of Spain (a coastal state impacted by the spill)
imprisoned the Bahamian vessel's Greek master' and brought
* Distinguished Visiting Professor of Maritime Studies, U.S. Coast Guard
Academy (2011-12); Judson Falknor Professor of Law, Adjunct Professor of Marine &
Environmental Affairs, University of Washington. The author served as an expert
witness for the United States in its criminal case against Fleet Management, Ltd.;
however, the opinions expressed are the author's and do not necessarily represent
the views of the United States or any other government.
1. Spain arrested the Prestige's 69-year-old Greek master, Apostolos
Mangouras, when he arrived in Spain. He was accused of not cooperating with
salvage crews and harming the environment and served 83 days in a high-security
prison following the incident. He was eventually released on bail, but was not
permitted to leave Spain, after the Shipowners' Protection and Indemnity
Association, the London P&I Club, went beyond its customary practice of insuring
owners alone to post bail in the amount of C3 million on behalf of the vessel's master.
To the surprise and dismay of maritime labor groups, the European Court of Human
Rights rejected Mangouras's challenge to Spain's extraordinarily high bail demand.
See Int'l Transport Workers' Fed., ITF and ETF Condemn Judgment on Prestige
Master Case (Oct. 22, 2010), available at http://www.itfglobal.org/news-online/
index.cfmlnewsdetail/5291/region/O/section/0/order/1. The ECHR opinion is reported
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suit in a United States court against the vessel's classification
society, American Bureau of Shipping (now ABS), for
compensatory damages of $1 billion or more, plus unspecified
punitive damages. 2 Following the 2007 MN Cosco Busan
incident, the United States indicted the vessel's pilot for his
conduct leading up to the allision. Fleet Management, Ltd.
(Fleet), the Hong Kong vessel's corporate operator, was also
indicted. In 2011, the Republic of the Marshall Islands came
under stinging criticism in a Coast Guard investigation into the
causes of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill for what could be
deemed flag state negligence. 3 A spokesman for the Marshall
Islands delivered a swift rejoinder.4 The exchange came not long
after a chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea issued a potentially far-reaching advisory opinion on state
responsibility and liability for at-sea activities by their nationals,
potentially tightening up the mesh size of the vessel safety net.5
Some might be tempted to dismiss or downplay the issue of
corporate criminal liability as inconsequential, because of the
often heard complaint that corporations cannot be imprisoned
and any fine is so small as to be a mere cost of doing business.
However, close inspection of what some refer to as the Alternative
Fines Act6 suggests it would be naive to trivialize the prospect of
corporate criminal liability. That statute increases the maximum
fines that may be imposed under the Clean Water Act, and other
at Mangouras v. Spain, no. 12050/04 Eur. Ct. H. R. (2010). See generally
International Maritime Organization-International Labor Organization, Guidelines
on Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of Maritime Accidents, IMO Res.
LEG.3(91) (2006), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWorkJLegal/JointIMOILO
WorkingGroupsOnSeafarerlssues/Documents/LEG3(91).pdf; Tullio Treves, Human
Rights and the Law of the Sea, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 11-12 (2010).
2. The court eventually granted summary judgment to ABS. Reino de Espaha v.
Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
3. See David Hammer, Coast Guard criticizes foreign flag state in Deepwater
Horizon blast, THE TIMES PICAYUNE, Apr. 22, 2011, available at http://www.nola.com
/news/gulf-oil-spilllindex.ssfl2011/04/coast-guardjinvestigativerepo.html.
4. Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator Marks
Anniversary of DEEPWATER HORIZON, Apr. 22, 2011, available at
http://www.brymar-consulting.com/wp-content/uploads/Misc/RMI1 10422.pdf.
5. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Seabed Disputes Chamber,
Responsibilities and Obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with
respect to activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion), Feb. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html. The implications of this thorough and carefully
crafted opinion for the law of flag state responsibility in matters other than
exploitation of deep seabed resources are beyond the scope of this article.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2006).
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statutes, to as much as twice the amount of the pecuniary loss
that the violation caused to other persons.7 While the $10 million
criminal fine eventually imposed on the Cosco Busan operator as
a result of a plea agreement might not seem particularly
remarkable by today's civil or criminal liability standards, with
an incident like the Deepwater Horizon, which resulted in clean
up costs and damage claims in the billions, the "pecuniary loss"
formula could result in a truly astronomical fine.8 Evidence
developed during the criminal investigation might also lead to
collateral consequences, including loss of opportunity for the ship
owner or operator to limit liability under the U.S. Limitation of
Liability Act9 or the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,10 loss of or
ineligibility for government contracts" and, for publicly traded
corporations, a potentially embarrassing requirement to disclose
to shareholders information regarding enforcement actions and
potential liabilities. 12 Finally, some violations render the involved
vessel subject to forfeiture. 13
It now seems clear that criminal liability for the harm
caused by a marine casualty can extend beyond those on board
the vessels who might have been guilty of "operational
negligence." This article examines one particular aspect of the
emerging development: the potential criminal liability of the
vessel owner or operator, typically a corporation, for a discharge
of oil in violation of the Clean Water Act. Recent cases have
7. Ordinarily, the maximum statutory fine for an organization that negligently
discharges oil in violation of the Clean Water Act would be $200,000. See 18 U.S.C. §
3571(c)(5) (2006). Any fact that increases the penalty above that maximum, under
the pecuniary loss option in 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), must be charged in the indictment,
submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Apparently, in order to take advantage of this
option in the Cosco Busan prosecution of Fleet and comply with Apprendi, the
Government filed a third superseding indictment alleging that Fleet's negligence
caused "at least approximately $20 million in pecuniary losses." See United States v.
Cota, No. CR 08-0160, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85186, at 9-10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2008).
8. As of February 1, 2012, when research for this article was completed, none of
the corporations involved in the Deepwater Horizon-Macondo oil spill had been
indicted for criminal Clean Water Act violations.
9. 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(B) (2006).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Item 103 of Regulation S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.103 (2011).
13. In the Cosco Busan litigation, the Department of Justice sought forfeiture of
the vessel pursuant to the Park System Resource Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 19jj- 1(b)
(2006), and the National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1437(e)(1) (2006).
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demonstrated that the owner's or operator's criminal liability
may be based on either vicarious liability for the criminal acts of
a mariner employed by the owner or operator or on a direct
liability theory. Civil liability based on vicarious liability is
nothing new. But vicarious criminal liability remains somewhat
controversial. 1 4 However, because vicarious criminal liability is
relatively easy to establish, 15 this article will only briefly examine
the duties relevant to a vicarious liability theory before turning to
the alternative direct liability theory for what some refer to as
"negligent management." It does so by examining the possible
means by which the direct criminal liability of the operator of the
Cosco Busan might have been established, had the case gone to
trial.
It must be emphasized that the factual allegations regarding
the defendants' conduct in the Cosco Busan allision and spill have
been selected for illustrative purposes, to provide the reader with
a "case study" for demonstrating how a charge of direct criminal
liability of a vessel owner might be discovered, developed and
proved. 16 Because that case was disposed of by plea agreement,
the allegations were never proven by the relevant criminal law
standard. 17 The reader must also bear in mind that this analysis
focuses primarily on proof of a charge of negligent discharge of oil
in violation of the Clean Water Act. It may or may not be relevant
14. See Katherine A. Swanson, Comment: The Cost of Doing Business:
Corporate Vicarious Criminal Liability for Negligent Discharge of Oil under the
Clean Water Act, 84 WASH. L. REV. 555 (2009).
15. A complaint occasionally made by Responsible Parties (RP) and their
insurers is that negligence is so easy to allege that the Government might be
tempted to threaten prosecution in order to coerce the RP into continuing to fund
removal actions even after the RP's limits of liability under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 have been reached.
16. The sources relied on include the NTSB, Coast Guard and Board of Pilot
Commissioners' investigation reports, along with the public docket materials on the
NTSB's supporting Docket Management System (DMS) web site. See NTSB, Docket
Management System, available at http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/searchlhitlist.cfm.
17. Fleet's guilty plea admitted that the crew of the vessel was not adequately
familiar with certain ship-specific navigational equipment, did not engage in a berth-
to-berth passage planning process or prepare written berth-to-berth passage plans,
did not conduct an adequate master-pilot exchange of information, did not fully
utilize or operate the ship's radar and electronic chart system and did not take fixes
during the voyage. See Joint Factual Statement attached to Plea Agreement, United
States v. Fleet Mgmt., Ltd., CR No. 08-0160 SI, filed Aug. 13, 2009; Press Release,
Env't & Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Cosco Busan Operator Admits Guilt
in Causing Oil Spill (Aug. 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2009/August/09-enrd-797.html.
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to violations of other statutes, even those incorporating a
negligence mens rea.18 Further, it is important to note that the
sources of the standard of care examined in this case study might
not be applicable in other cases, depending on the location of the
conduct involved and the nature, tonnage, route and flag of the
vessel. The Cosco Busan allision and oil spill occurred in the
internal waters of the United States. Had the spill occurred
offshore, relevant provisions of 1IARPOL 19 and the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea 20 might have to be considered,
to the extent that those latter provisions are binding on the U.S.
as a matter of customary international law. Finally, every case
study is a product of the laws and regulations in effect at the time
and place of the occurrence. This particular case study is set in
the year 2007. Later incidents must of course be evaluated under
the then-existing legal regime.
Part I of the article summarizes factual allegations and
findings in the public record surrounding the 2007 Cosco Busan
allision and the criminal charges that followed. Part II then
examines the two theories (direct and vicarious) for establishing
corporate criminal liability. Part III identifies the duties relevant
to a vicarious liability theory, and Part IV examines the ship
owner and operator duties relevant to a direct liability theory.
Part V then draws on the Cosco Busan incident as a case study to
demonstrate how direct liability for a negligent discharge of oil in
violation of the Clean Water Act might be proved.
18. Other commonly charged maritime crimes that may incorporate different
mental elements include the so-called Seaman Manslaughter Statute (18 U.S.C. §
1115), the Refuse Act (33 U.S.C. § 407) and the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships
(33 U.S.C. § 1907). The Refuse Act is a strict liability offense, requiring no proof of
intent or negligence. IMC Shipping Company, the operator of the M/V Selendang
Ayu, which ran aground in the Aleutian Islands in late 2005 after suffering an
engine casualty, was charged with violating the Refuse Act as a result of the spill of
some 340,000 gallons of fuel oil and its cargo of soybeans. IMC pleaded guilty and
was fined $10 million. See Press Release, Env't & Natural Resources Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Ship Operator Pleads Guilty and Sentenced to Pay $10 Million Related to
Charges Arising from Grounding in the Aleutians (August 22, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/August/07_enrd_ 644.html.
19. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Vessels [MARPOL], Nov. 2, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 10561, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184, 12 I.L.M.
1319 (1973), as amended by 1978 Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention Protocol,
June 1, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61, 17 I.L.M. 546 (1978).
20. See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, pt. XII, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M 1261 (1982).
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II. THE COSCO BUSAN ALLISION: NEGLIGENCE ON
BOARD OR IN THE BOARD ROOM?
Despite the name of the South Korean shipping giant
"Hanjin" painted in block letters several feet tall on both sides of
its 901-foot-long hull, 21 the Hong Kong-registered containership
MIV Cosco Busan was neither owned nor operated by that Korean
company, but rather by a Byzantine web of ship owning and
operating companies based in Hong Kong ("Cosco" is the acronym
for the government-owned China Ocean Shipping Company). On
the day of the allision, the vessel was owned by Regal Stone, Ltd.
(Regal) and operated by Fleet Management, Ltd., the fourth
largest ship management company in the world, with its
headquarters in Hong Kong. 22 Fleet was, in turn, wholly owned
by The Noble Group, Ltd. The master, officers and crew of the
Cosco Busan were all Chinese nationals, who were on the third
leg of their first voyage with the vessel, which began in Busan
two weeks before the allision. Although the vessel was a
container ship, not a tanker, its fuel capacity was more than two
million gallons. 23
Regal took ownership of the Cosco Busan on October 24,
2007, and turned the ship over to Fleet to manage. The ship
sailed from Busan, Republic of Korea, to Long Beach, California
the next day. After a brief stop in Long Beach for cargo
operations, the ship journeyed north to Oakland via San
Francisco Bay. The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB)24 determined that on November 7, 2007, the Cosco Busan
21. The vessel, which can be tracked by its IMO Number 9231743, regardless of
any name changes, was formerly named the Hanjin Cairo. It was renamed the Cosco
Busan in November of 2006. According to the U.S. Coast Guard Port State
Information Exchange (PSIX) database, the vessel is now named the Haijin Venezia.
22. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., NTSB/MAR-09/01, Marine Accident Report:
Allision of Hong Kong-Registered Containership M/V Cosco Busan with the Delta
Tower of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge [NTSB Report] at 4 (2009),
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/20091MARO901.pdf. See also Board of Pilot
Commissioners for the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo and Suisun, Incident
Review Committee Report: Nov. 7, 2007 Allision with the San Francisco-Oakland
Bay Bridge, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.bopc.ca.gov/res/docs/
notices/CotaIRCReport.pdf.
23. NTSB Report, supra note 22 at 33 (reporting a capacity of 2.069 million
gallons of intermediate fuel oil and 107,000 gallons of marine diesel oil).
24. Id.; see also U.S. Coast Guard, Report of the Investigation into the Allision of
The COSCO BUSAN with the Delta Tower of the San Francisco Bay Bridge in San
Francisco Bay on November 7, 2007 [U.S. Coast Guard Report], Mar. 2, 2009,
redacted version available at http://www.uscg.mil/foia/CoscoBuscan/COSCO
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was scheduled to depart its berth at pier 56 in the Port of
Oakland at 0700. The ship was carrying 2,529 containers and was
destined for Busan. A pilot from the San Francisco Bar Pilots
Association was assigned to navigate the vessel from the time it
left the berth until it exited the bay. Dense fog was restricting
visibility in the bay when the pilot boarded the vessel at about
0620. When he arrived on the bridge, he introduced himself to the
ship's master and handed him a San Francisco Bar Pilots' pilot
card. The master asked the pilot, "...can go?" to which the pilot
replied that they would "take a look at things" and see how the
visibility developed.
The vessel's third mate, who was serving as the bridge watch
officer for the outbound passage, provided the pilot with the
vessel's pilot card, which contained ship characteristics and ship
maneuvering performance data. The pilot acknowledged receipt
of this information by signing the document, noting "rec'd only"
next to his signature and citing the name of the assist tug to be
used just below his signature. This same pilot card had a
checklist for the crew to use before departing to verify that the
ship's vital navigation, steering and mooring gear had been tested
and was operational. About 0800, the vessel got underway with
the aid of a tractor tug. About this time, the voyage data recorder
(VDR) recorded the voice of a crewmember saying, in Mandarin,
"American ships under such conditions, they would not be under
way." 25
The vessel proceeded outbound on a slow bell until 0820,
when the pilot ordered half ahead. At about 0826, he ordered the
engines full ahead, despite the fact that the pilot was uncertain of
his position, complained of a radar malfunction, expressed
confusion over the ECDIS 2 6 symbology and had apparently lost
BUSANfinal030609.pdf. Coast Guard marine casualty investigations are
inadmissible in civil or administrative proceedings, other than an administrative
proceeding initiated by the United States. 46 U.S.C. § 6308 (2006).
25. Transcripts of the VDR recordings are available on the NTSB DMS web site,
supra note 16. Reportedly, four other deep draft ships delayed their departures that
morning until visibility improved. See MSNBC.com, Ship in Bay Area spill was only
one to sail in fog, Mar. 27, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.coml
id/23829561/ns/usnews-environment/t/ship-bay-area-spill-was-only-one-sail-fog/.
Visibility and departure delays are discussed in Board of Pilot Commissioners
Report, supra note 22 at 6.
26. ECDIS is the acronym for Electronic Chart Display and Information System,
which is now required on most large merchant vessels. ECDIS integrates vessel
position information with a digitized navigation chart. A number of companies
2012] 275
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situational awareness. At approximately 0830, following a radio
inquiry regarding the vessel's intentions from the San Francisco
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) and a series of last minute evasive
course changes, the vessel allided with the fendering system at
the base of the Delta tower of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay
Bridge. Contact with the bridge tower tore open a 212-foot-long
by 10-foot-high by 8-foot-deep gash in the forward port side of the
ship and breached the Numbers 3 and 4 port fuel tanks and the
Number 2 port ballast tank. As a result of the breached fuel
tanks, about 53,500 gallons of fuel oil were released into San
Francisco Bay. No injuries or fatalities resulted from the
accident; however, according to the NTSB estimate, the fuel spill
contaminated about 26 miles of shoreline, killed more than 2,500
birds representing some 50 species, temporarily closed a fishery
on the bay and delayed the start of the crab-fishing season. The
NTSB estimated total monetary damages to be $2.1 million for
the ship, $1.5 million for the bridge and more than $70 million for
environmental cleanup.
On March 17, 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a
two count criminal Information against the vessel's pilot for
violations of the Clean Water Act 2 7 and Migratory Bird Treaty
Act. 2 8 On July 23, 2008, a federal grand jury returned an
indictment against both the pilot and the vessel's operator, Fleet
Management, Ltd.29 The new indictment alleged two False
manufacture and market ECDIS units. See U.S. Coast Guard Report, supra note 24,
at 4-5; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea [SOLAS], Reg.
V/19.2.1.4, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. 9700, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2; as amended by
the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974, Feb. 17, 1978, 32 U.S.T. 5577, T.I.A.S. 10009, 1226 U.N.T.S. 237; U.S.
Coast Guard, Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NAVIC) 02-03 (2003).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (2006). Information, United States v. John Cota,
Mar.17, 2008, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/can/community/Notifications/
documents/2008 03_17_cotainformation.pdf. The charges set out in the Information
were later incorporated into a superseding indictment that added a false statement
charge. See Superseding Indictment, United States v. John Cota, Apr. 22, 2008,
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/cani/press/press-documents/S-
Indictment.pdf. On March 6, 2009, Cota pleaded guilty and was later sentenced to
ten months imprisonment. See Press Release, Env't & Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Prison Sentence for Cosco Busan pilot (July 17, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2009/July/09-enrd-698.html.
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703,707 (2006).
29. See Press Release, Env't & Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Company
that Managed Cosco Busan Indicted on New Charges (July 23, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2008/July/08-enrd-642.html.
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Statement Act3 0 violations against the pilot, Migratory Bird
Treaty Act and Clean Water Act violations against the pilot and
Fleet and three False Statement Act violations and three
Obstruction of Justice 31 violations against Fleet alone. The
indictment alleged that Fleet violated the Clean Water Act by
negligently discharging oil into the navigable waters of the
United States.32 It also charged the company with falsifying
documents after the allision to cover up the company's
negligence.3
Fleet initially sought to enter a plea of nolo contendere,
arguing to the court that it played no role in the allision. In its
motion, Fleet alleged that the allision was caused solely by the
negligence of the pilot, the U. S. Coast Guard, the California
Board of Pilot Commissioners, the San Francisco Bar Pilots
Association and the doctor who examined the pilot. On October 7,
2008, the trial court denied Fleet's motion. 34 Fleet eventually pled
guilty to charges of negligently causing the oil spill and of
obstruction of justice and making a false official statement. 35 On
February 23, 2009, the company was sentenced by the federal
district court to pay a fine of $10 million and to comply with
certain remedial measures. 36
On September 19, 2011, the final chapter of the 2007 Cosco
Busan criminal and civil litigation by the U.S. against the vessel
and her owners and operators was closed. On that day, the U.S.
Department of Justice, the State of California, the city and
county of San Francisco and the city of Richmond, Calif., signed
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (2006).
33. This count included allegations that Fleet or its officers had falsified the
ship's navigational chart to show fixes that were not actually recorded during the
voyage, concealed ship's records and created materially false, fictitious and forged
documents with an intent to influence the Coast Guard's investigation. The alleged
forged documents included a false berth-to-berth passage plan for the day of the
allision, which was allegedly created after the incident at the direction of shore-side
supervisors and with the knowledge of the ship's master.
34. United States v. Cota, No. CR 08-0160, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85186, at 3-4
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2008).
35. See Press Release, Env't & Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Cosco
Busan Operator Admits Guilt in Causing Oil Spill (Aug. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2009/August/09-enrd-797.html. None of the officers or
crew of the Cosco Busan were charged, nor were any officers or directors of Fleet.
36. United States v. Fleet Mgmt., Ltd., No. 08-0160 SI, judgment entered (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 23, 2010).
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and lodged a consent decree that requires Regal and Fleet to pay
$44.4 million for natural resource damages and penalties and to
reimburse the governmental entities for response costs incurred
as a result of the oil spill. 37
When the guilty plea agreement with Fleet was announced
in 2009, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) spokesmen made clear
their resolve to scrutinize the conduct of vessel owners and
operators whose ships pollute U.S. waters for evidence of direct
criminal liability. One spokesman announced the Government's
view that "navigation of large vessels is a serious undertaking
and those who fail to adequately train, execute and supervise
their responsibilities will be held accountable."3 8 Another added
that the defendant, Fleet, "failed to meet its obligation under
international law to ensure the crew was adequately trained on
navigation procedures and equipment. Vessel operators cannot
abdicate their responsibilities to ensure safety and environmental
protection without suffering serious consequences." 3 9
Had Fleet contested the charges, the government would have
been required to establish the company's culpability beyond a
reasonable doubt. As highlighted above, the general rule is that
corporate criminal liability may be established through vicarious
liability, direct liability or a combination of the two. The general
rule is of course subject to the actual language of the particular
statute the corporation is charged with violating and any relevant
legislative intent, which might expressly include or foreclose
vicarious liability.
37. See Press Release, Env't Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Ship
Owners and Operators to Pay $44 million in Damages and Penalties for 2007 San
Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge Crash and Oil Spill (Sept. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2011/September/11-enrd-1209.html. See generally
United States v. M/V Cosco Busan, 557 F.Supp.2d 1058, (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2008)
(generally describing the nature of the civil claims while denying defendants' motion
to dismiss).
38. Press Release, Env't & Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, John C.
Cruden, Acting Attorney General for DOJ Environmental and Natural Resources
Division, in Cosco Busan Operator Admits Guilt in Causing Oil Spill, Aug. 13, 2009,
available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2009/August/09-enrd-797.html.
39. Id., statement of Joseph P. Russoniello, U.S. Attorney for the Northern
District of California.
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III. THEORIES OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
In the aftermath of the 1989 TN Exxon Valdez oil spill,
Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).40 One
section of OPA 90 amended the Clean Water Act to prescribe
criminal sanctions for negligent or knowing discharges of oil in
violation 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3). 41 The CWA prohibition extends
to any "person" who negligently discharges oil into waters of the
United States. "Person" is defined to include corporationS42 and
any "responsible corporate officer."43 As with the civil tort of
negligence, more than one person's negligence may cause the
harm (an oil discharge in this case); therefore, more than one
person might be found guilty of negligently causing a particular
discharge of oil (as were the pilot and Fleet in this case).
As discussed more fully in section IV, corporations generally
bear direct liability for negligent acts or omissions by their
officers and other high level managers. The CWA is silent on
whether it includes or precludes vicarious criminal liability for
entities whose lower level agents or employees commit violations
of the act and on the elements of a "negligent" discharge.
Admiralty courts may therefore turn to the law of Agency to
determine the parameters of a principal's liability for the acts or
omissions of its agent or employee. 44 The Restatement (Third) of
Agency distinguishes between direct and vicarious liability in
Section 7.03 (Principal's Liability--In General):45
(1) A principal is subject to direct liability to a third party
harmed by an agent's conduct when
(a) as stated in § 7.04, the agent acts with actual
authority or the principal ratifies the agent's conduct
and (i) the agent's conduct is tortious, or (ii) the agent's
conduct, if that of the principal, would subject the
principal to tort liability; or
40. Oil Pollution Control Act 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484; H.R. Rep.
No. 101-653, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779.
41. Oil Pollution Control Act 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 §
4301(c)(2), (3); H.R. Rep. No. 101-653, at 154 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
779, 833.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (2006).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2006).
44. Dubret v. Holland Am. Line Westours, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (W.D. Wash.
1998) (acknowledging that admiralty has adopted agency principles).
45. American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.03 (2006)
(emphasis added).
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(b) as stated in § 7.05, the principal is negligent in
selecting, supervising, or otherwise controlling the
agent; or
(c) as stated in § 7.06, the principal delegates
performance of a duty to use care to protect other
persons or their property to an agent who fails to
perform the duty.
(2) A principal is subject to vicarious liability to a third
party harmed by an agent's conduct when
(a) as stated in § 7.07, the agent is an employee who
commits a tort while acting within the scope of
employment; or
(b) as stated in § 7.08, the agent commits a tort when
acting with apparent authority in dealing with a third
party on or purportedly on behalf of the principal.
A principal's liability under agency theories is most
commonly associated with civil tort. And, even in civil-admiralty
matters, the general maritime law and some statutes limit the
shipowner's vicarious liability. For example, in the Amiable
Nancy, Justice Story writing for the U.S. Supreme Court, held
that punitive damages may not be imposed on a shipowner for the
acts of its captain or crew unless the owner either directed or
participated in the offense. 46 Similarly, the Limitation of Liability
Act 4 7 and the "error in navigation" defense under Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act 4 8 shield the shipowner from vicarious liability
claims or at least limit that liability in some circumstances.
46. 16 U.S. 546 (1818). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979).
But see CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding
imposition of punitive damages under vicarious liability theory). The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, was equally divided on whether maritime law
allowed corporate liability for punitive damages based on the acts of managerial
agents. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 484 (2008). It therefore left
the court of appeals' opinion undisturbed in this respect, noting that the disposition
here was not precedential on the derivative-liability question. See generally
Christopher R. Green, Punishing Corporations: The Food Chain Schizophrenia in
Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 197 (2008) (examining the
question how high up the corporate "food chain" must misconduct extend before the
corporation will be held criminally liable or civilly liable for punitive damages).
47. 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2006) (opportunity for ship owner or charterer to limit
liability turns on whether the causative negligence occurred within the privity or
knowledge of the vessel owner or charterer).
48. Act of 1936 (Carriage of Goods by Sea Act), § 4(2)(a) (neither the carrier nor
the ship shall be liable for cargo loss arising from negligence in navigation or
Corporate Criminal Liability
Criminal responsibility based on vicarious liability is not
unknown to the law. 4 9 In United States v. Ionia Management
S.A. 50 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed
the distinction between vicarious liability and direct liability in a
2009 criminal case against a ship management company. In the
trial below, the district court instructed the jury that
As a legal entity, a corporation can only act vicariously
through its agents; that is, through its directors, officers,
and employees or other persons authorized to act for it. A
corporation may be held criminally liable for the acts of its
agent done on behalf of and for the benefit of the
corporation, and directly related to the performance of the
duties the employee has authority to perform.5 '
The district court went on to instruct the jury that:
... You have been instructed that lonia, as a corporate
entity, is legally responsible for the acts or omissions of its
agents or employees under certain circumstances. You
must find that the Government has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that acts attributable to lonia were acts
or omissions of its agents performed "within the scope of
their employment" with lonia as I will now define that
term.
An act or omission that was specifically authorized by the
corporation would be within the scope of the agent's
employment. Even if the act or omission was not
specifically authorized, it may still be within the scope of
an agent's employment if (1) the agent acted for the
benefit of the corporation and (2) the agent was acting
within his authority. It is not necessary that the
Government prove that the corporation was actually
benefitted, only that the agent intended it would be.
If you find that the agent was acting within the scope of
his employment, the fact that the agent's act was illegal,
contrary to his employer's instructions, or against the
management of the ship), formerly codified at 46 U.S.C. § 1304, now at 46 U.S.C. §
30701 Note (2006).
49. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-
94 (1909); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 2003) §§ 13.4-13.5.
50. 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009).
51. United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 526 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325 (D. Conn. 2007).
2012] 281
Loyola Maritime Law Journal
corporation's policies will not necessarily relieve the
corporation of responsibility for the agent's act. You may
consider whether the agent disobeyed instructions or
violated company policy in determining whether the agent
intended to benefit the corporation, and/or was acting
within his authority.
In determining whether an agent was acting for the
benefit of the corporation, you are instructed that the
Government need not prove that the agent was only
concerned with benefitting the corporation. It is sufficient
if one of the agent's purposes was to benefit the
corporation.
The Second Circuit upheld the conviction of lonia
Management and the $4.9 million fine imposed below for a
MARPOL oil record book violation. 52 Assuming the Second
Circuit's decision in lonia Management was correctly decided and
that the court's reasoning can be extended from MARPOL
violations to CWA violations, the prosecution against Fleet could
have proceeded under a direct liability or vicarious liability
theory or some combination of the two. Federal prosecutors have
a good deal of discretion in such matters. Relevant guidance to
U.S. Attorneys provides, inter alia, that
in conducting an investigation, determining whether to
bring charges, and negotiating plea or other agreements,
prosecutors should consider the following factors in
reaching a decision as to the proper treatment of a
corporate target . . . the pervasiveness of wrongdoing
within the corporation, including the complicity in, or the
condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate management. 53
52. Oil record books are required by Regulation 17 of Annex I to the MARPOL
convention. Int'l Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Vessels
[MARPOL], Nov. 2, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 10561, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184, 12 I.L.M. 1319
(1973), as amended by 1978 Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention Protocol, June
1, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61, 17 I.L.M. 546 (1978). MARPOL violations are enforced in
the U.S. through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (2006).
53. See Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Manual: Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations, § 9-28.300(A)(2) (1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm.
Charging decisions are generally made in consultation with the Environmental
Crimes Section of the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the
Department of Justice.
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The Manual goes on to say, "it may not be appropriate to
impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust
compliance program in place, under a strict respondeat superior
theory for the single isolated act of a rogue employee." 54 In short,
DOJ is more likely to prosecute where there is evidence of direct
corporate criminal liability. Before examining the direct liability
theory, the article will briefly examine vicarious liability.
IV. ESTABLISHING CORPORATE VICARIOUS
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Corporate criminal liability may be found under the
vicarious liability theory where the offense was committed by an
employee or agent of the corporation, each of the acts was done
within the course and scope of employment or agency and the
employee or agent committed each of the essential elements of
the offense with the intent to benefit the corporation. Most
tortious acts by a vessel's master and crew in the operation of the
vessel will therefore give rise to vicarious liability claims against
the vessel owner or operator who employs them.55 Under U.S.
law, however, a shipowner may be held vicariously liable for the
negligence of a voluntary pilot, but not a compulsory pilot.56
Where the underlying "offense" is the negligent discharge of oil in
violation of the CWA, the question arises regarding what degree
of negligence by the employee or agent is required. This issue is
addressed in section III.A below.
Two excellent, although somewhat dated, guides are
available to assist attorneys (and their experts) in developing
evidence for collision and allision cases.57 Those guides will be
equally useful in developing or defending against criminal
negligence charges based on vicarious liability theory. To the
54. Id. § 9-28.500(A). The prosecutor is also directed to consider collateral
consequences of a conviction. See id. at § 9-28.1000. Collateral consequences are
discussed supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
55. Torts by the vessel master and crew may also give rise to a maritime lien on
the vessel.
56. See, e.g., Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. La Compagnie Generale
Tansatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, 415 (1901) (holding that the owner is not vicariously
liable for compulsory pilot's negligence). See also The China, 74 U.S. 53 (1868)
(holding a ship is liable in rem for compulsory pilot's negligence).
57. See, e.g., JOHN F. MEADOWS, PREPARING A SHIP COLLISION CASE FOR TRIAL,
17 Am. Jur. Trials § 501 (1970) (Updated Apr. 2011); JOHN F. MEADOWS & DAVID F.
SEARS, SHIP COLLISION: TECHNICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS; INVESTIGATION AND
PREPARATION FOR SUIT, 63 Am Jur. Trials § 347 (1997).
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author's knowledge, however, no such guidance is available that
specifically addresses discovery and evidentiary issues relevant to
a direct criminal liability charge for a negligent discharge of oil in
violation of the CWA. Section IV of the article is intended to fill
that need.
A. CRIMINAL CULPABILITY STANDARD
As a general rule, the standard for establishing negligence to
support a criminal conviction is higher than the standard applied
in civil tort. For example, the Model Penal Code provides that
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element
of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and
justifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.5 8
The mens rea element of a crime may of course be prescribed
by the legislature. However, congress did not define the term
"negligence" for purposes of applying the new OPA 90 criminal
penalties. In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Hanousek, rejected the more exacting
standard under the Model Penal Code and held instead that
conviction for a negligent discharge under the Clean Water Act
required only proof of ordinary negligence with respect to the
elements of the crime. 59 Ordinary negligence is established by
58. Model Penal Code § 2.02(d) (1962). The July 2005 Council of Europe
Directive similarly adopts a heightened standard of negligence, calling for criminal
penalties in cases involving "serious" negligence or intentional or reckless conduct.
See Olagunju G. Anthony, Criminalization of Seafarers for Accidental Discharge of
Oil: Is there Justification in International Law for Criminal Sanction for Negligent or
Accidental Pollution of the Sea?, 37 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 219, 224 (2006) (citing Article
4 of the Directive).
59. United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding jury
instruction that charged failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances
is sufficient to establish negligent discharge), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000).
Accord United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Hanousek
and holding no heightened level of mens rea for negligent discharge). See also
Michael G. Chalos & Wayne A. Parker, The Criminalization of Maritime Accidents
and MARPOL Violations in the United States, 23 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 206 (2010-2011);
Samara Johnston, Is Ordinary Negligence Enough to be Criminal? Reconciling
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evidence that the defendant breached a duty to exercise
reasonable care and that the breach was a proximate cause of the
injury suffered. Accordingly, this section of the article identifies
some of the sources of the duty that would be applicable in a
charge of a negligent discharge of oil from a vessel in violation of
the CWA.
B. THE BASES FOR THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE
As U.S. District Judge Holland made clear early on in the
Exxon Valdez oil spill litigation, oil spills in U.S. navigable waters
constitute a "maritime" tort within the federal admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction. 6o Accordingly, we look to admiralty's choice
of law rules in determining the sources of law establishing the
standard of care applicable to an oil spill in the navigable waters
of the United States.61
The gravamen of a charge of negligent discharge of oil is the
defendant's breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent such a discharge, where that breach was a proximate
cause of the discharge. Duty is a question of law, reviewable de
novo on appeal. 62 The applicable standard of care may be
established by legislative enactments, administrative regulations
or prior judicial decisions. 63 Additionally, industry custom may be
taken into account in determining the standard of care. 64 In the
absence of a specific statutory duty, the duty owed is one of
reasonable care under the circumstances. 65 The sources for the
standard of care applicable to the master and crew of the Cosco
Busan (for whom the owner or operator might be vicariously
liable) included the general maritime law, along with several
United States v. Hanousek with the Liability Limitation Provisions of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, 12 U.S.F. MAR. L J. 263 (1999-2000).
60. The Exxon Valdez, 1991 AMC 1482 (D. Alaska 1991). See also United States
v. Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz,
954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
61. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (maritime law, not common
law, governs torts within admiralty jurisdiction).
62. United States v. Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 1982).
63. In maritime law, breach of a duty imposed by statute is referred to as
"statutory fault." See Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S. 140 (1972)
(citing The Pennsylvania, 19 Wall. 125 (1874)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 285 (1965) (how standard of conduct is determined).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 13 (2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 295A (1965).
65. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. The Atropos Island, 777 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir.
1985).
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laws and regulations, including most prominently the U.S.
Navigation Safety Regulations and the Inland Navigation Rules
(often called the Collision Regulations).
Regardless of the degree of negligence required by the
particular statute, proof of causation is a necessary element of
criminal negligence. In cases alleging a negligent discharge of oil
in violation of the CWA the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant's negligence caused the
discharge. Where, for example, oil is discharged as a result of a
vessel's allision with a bridge structure, any negligent act or
omission that was a cause of that allision would be relevant to the
criminal charge, while non-causative fault would not.66 Whether
causation might be provisionally established by an applicable
presumption is addressed in the next section.
1. PRESUMPTIONS UNDER GENERAL MARITIME LAW
Maritime law has several well-established presumptions that
would apply in civil admiralty suits arising out of incidents like
the Cosco Busan allision. For example, in 1895 the U.S. Supreme
Court established a presumption of fault on the part of a ship
that runs aground or allides with a fixed object.67 Additionally,
where a vessel is found to have violated a statute or regulation
designed to promote safety of navigation (such as the Inland
Navigation Rules or the U.S. Navigation Safety Regulations)
there is a presumption that the violation was a cause of the
casualty.68 Admiralty has also adopted the res ipsa loquitur
rule. 69 Although such presumptions or burden-shifting rules
might not be appropriate in a criminal case, where the defendant
is presumed innocent, an expert witness might be able to cite and
rely on these presumptions in forming an opinion for later
testimony in a prosecution, particularly where, in the expert's
opinion, the presumptions have a substantial empirical basis. 70
66. Proof of proximate causation is also required to break the responsible party's
liability limits under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2006).
67. The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186 (1895).
68. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873).
69. Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Mays Towing Co., Inc., 927 F.2d 1453 (8th Cir.
1991); 1st Bank Southeast of Kenosha, Wis. v. M/V Kanlindas, 670 F. Supp. 1421
(E.D. Wis. 1987); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 (2010).
70. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (expert may base opinion on otherwise inadmissible
matters "if of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences"). FED. R. EVID. 803(18) establishes an exception to
the hearsay rule for so-called "learned treatises" relied upon by the expert in direct
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2. DUTIES UNDER GENERAL MARITIME LAw
Notwithstanding the teachings of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,7 federal courts exercising their admiralty jurisdiction
play a continuing role in "making" federal law.7 2 Given the
relative paucity of statutory sources, this body of judge-made
"general maritime law" continues to play an indispensible role in
defining and developing the standard of care in maritime torts.
For example, the often-quoted "Learned Hand formula" for
negligence arose out of an admiralty case.73 Similarly, Judge
Hand's well-known decision on the role of "customary practice" in
determining the relevant standard of care arose out of an
admiralty case. 74
3. DUTIES UNDER THE U.S. NAVIGATION SAFETY REGULATIONS
Admiralty courts also look to violations of applicable statutes
and regulations as evidence of the standard of care (similarly,
federal courts in the M/V Summit Venture bridge allision case
cited below looked to international standards).75 For example, in
Western Pacific Fisheries v. S.S. President Grant,76 a case
concerning a collision between a fog-bound container ship and a
fishing vessel in San Francisco Bay, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit considered the container ship's violation of the
federal Navigation Safety Regulations77 in its determination of
examination or called to the attention of the expert on cross examination, if
established as "reliable" by the testifying expert, another expert, or by judicial notice.
FED. R. EVID. 803(18). Some of the treatises that might be relevant in a collision or
allision case are cited in this article.
71. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
72. See generally Joel Goldstein, Ernest young, Robert Force & Steven Friedell,
Admiralty Symposium, Federal Common Law in Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1337 (1999).
73. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (setting
out the B < P x L framework).
74. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (2010) provides that "An actor is
negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed to protect
against the type of accident the actor's conduct causes, and if the accident victim is
within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect." The "accident" in this
case being an unintentional discharge of oil into the waters of the U.S., international
and national measures intended to enhance port and vessel safety are plainly
intended to prevent that sort of harm. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
286 (1965) (when standard of conduct defined by legislation or regulation will be
adopted).
76. 730 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1984).
77. 33 C.F.R. § 164 (2011).
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fault. Additionally, courts often look to the applicable Inland
Navigation Rules78 establishing requirements for a look-out, the
use of radar and other devices, risk assessment practices and the
need to proceed at a safe speed.
The detailed Navigation Safety Regulations (NSRs)
requirements for "navigation under way" by vessels of 1600 or
more tons operating on U.S. waters apply to the "owner, master
or person in charge" of each vessel underway.79 As the Ninth
Circuit held in Western Pacific Fisheries, violation of the NSRs
constitutes statutory fault, which is akin to negligence per se.80
The NSRs require, among other things, that the vessel's
wheelhouse be constantly manned by persons who fix the vessel's
position, plot that position on a chart (rejecting a passive "watch-
the-TV monitor" approach to navigation), inform the person
directing the movement of the vessel of the vessel's position and
provide certain ship maneuvering information to the pilot. Fixes
are to be obtained using "electronic and other navigational
equipment, external fixed aids to navigation, geographic
reference points, and hydrographic contours."81 In addition, the
NSRs include detailed criteria for determining safe speed.82
Applying the NSRs "safe speed" criteria to the Cosco Busan
allision, it is difficult to believe that even half ahead, which was
13 knots, according to the vessel's Pilot Card,83 was a safe speed
78. The U.S. Inland Rules at the time of this case, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2037. The
Inland Rules were later transferred from the U.S. Code to the Code of Federal
Regulations. See 33 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2011).
79. 33 C.F.R. § 164.11 (2011). The language raises a question whether the NSRs
apply ex proprio vigore to Fleet, as an operator, or are simply evidence of the
standard of care for operating covered vessels in U.S. waters and therefore serve as
one of the many legal requirements which Fleet had an obligation to ensure its vessel
complied with. In the state of Washington, the pilotage regulations make it clear that
the obligation to comply with the NSRs rests with the vessel. Washington pilots are
required to obtain assurance from the vessel master that the vessel complies with the
NSRs before piloting the vessel. Wash. Admin. Code §§ 363-116-200 to 2051.
80. It is also worth noting that such violations might result in an owner losing
the applicable limitation of liability for the resulting oil spill under the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990. See supra note 10.
81. 33 C.F.R. § 164.11(d) (2011). Navigation near the Delta-Echo span of the Bay
Bridge is facilitated by both a Racon marking the center of the span and radar
reflector-equipped buoys at either end of Delta tower, proper use of which would have
improved the bridge team's situational awareness.
82. See 33 C.F.R. § 164.11(p) (2011).
83. Those speeds were calculated by converting the RPM figures from the engine
bell log print out covering the period immediately preceding the allision to the speed-
RPM figures in the Pilot Card the vessel provided to the pilot.
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under the circumstances. Moreover, there is virtually no
possibility that it was "safe" to come up to full speed, or 17 knots,
in those fateful three minutes before alliding with the bridge,
given the poor visibility, position uncertainty and loss of
situational awareness.
The NSRs complement standards regarding the master-pilot
relationship prescribed by the STCW Code and the related IMO
resolution, requiring, as they do, the crew to take and plot fixes
and to notify the person directing the movement of the vessel of
the results. The Cosco Busan bridge team appears to have
violated those NSRs requirements. For example, the third mate
apparently failed to report to the pilot that the vessel was 200
yards left of its intended track at 0820.84 If true, that omission
would likely have contributed to the pilot's position uncertainty.
4. DUTIES UNDER THE INLAND NAVIGATION RULES
A vessel's violation of the applicable Inland Navigation
Rules, or International Collision Regulations, is perhaps the most
commonly cited basis for finding fault in vessel collision cases. 85
Relevant rules in the case of the Cosco Busan might include Rules
5 (look-out), 6 (safe speed), 7 (risk of collision), 8 (action to avoid
collision, particularly 8(e)) and 19 (conduct in restricted
visibility). Because a number of treatises extensively examine
those rules and the cases interpreting them, they will not be
examined here. 86
84. See U.S. Coast Guard Report, supra note 24, at 30 (Finding #10).
85. Some courts decline to invoke the rules of the road or the "Pennsylvania
rule" in cases not involving collisions. See, e.g., Southard v. Lester, 2008 AMC 1467
(4th Cir. 2008) ("specifically, we hold that the International Regulations and the
Pennsylvania Rule are inapplicable in this case because [the vessel] was not involved
in a collision"). But see Cliffs-Neddrill Turnkey International-Oranjestad, Neddrill 2
B.V. v. M/T Rich Duke, 1991 AMC 1232 (D. Del.1991); Davis v. Superior Oil Co., 510
F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (E.D. La. 1981). In dicta, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the
rule should not be applied "beyond its traditional domain of ship collisions and
navigational accidents"; however, even that test would embrace allision cases. See
MacDonald v. Kahikolu, Ltd., 581 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 2010).
86. See generally CRAIG H. ALLEN, FARWELL'S NAUTICAL RULES OF THE ROAD
(8th ed. 2005); A. NORMAN COCKCROFT & J. N. F. LAMEIJER, A GUIDE TO THE
COLLISION AVOIDANCE RULES (6th ed. 2004); SIMON GAULT, MARSDEN ON
COLLISIONS AT SEA (2003) (vol. 4 of British Shipping Laws); NICHOLAS J. HEALY &
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY, THE LAW OF MARINE COLLISION (1998).
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V. ESTABLISHING DIRECT CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
To restate the criminal liability paths somewhat differently
than in the previous section, there are two distinct theories for
imposing corporate criminal liability: identification and
imputation.87 The claim of liability under identification is that
the acts of certain individuals should be treated as the actual acts
of the corporation. Those acts establish direct liability of the
corporation. Thus, a corporate shipowner or operator may be held
criminally liable under the direct liability theory where a
corporation officer or "high-level" manager commits a negligent
act or omission. By contrast, imputation refers to acts by lower-
level employees or agents of the corporation, for which the
corporation bears only vicarious liability under the principle of
respondeat superior. Vicarious liability was examined in the
previous section.
A corporate shipowner or operator may be held criminally
liable under the direct liability theory where the corporation was
negligent in selecting, supervising, or otherwise controlling its
agents or employees or in carrying out a duty legally assigned
directly to the owner or operator.88 In announcing the plea
agreement in the Cosco Busan prosecution, Department of Justice
spokesmen plainly signaled their commitment to hold vessel
owners and operators to their non-delegable duties. There are
sound reasons for doing so, either alone or in conjunction with a
vicarious liability theory. Some also find the directly liability
theory more compelling, particularly with regard to charging and
sentencing.89
87. James Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65
KY. L. J. 73 (1976).
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03(1)(b) (2006). An allegation of
negligence in hiring arguably opens the door to proof of the employee's character for
safety, provable by specific instances of conduct. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 405.
89. The "culpability" provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual
applicable to organizations increases the culpability score, and therefore, the
potential sentence, where high-level personnel participated in, condoned, or were
willfully ignorant of the offense. See 2010 Federal Sentencing Manual § 8C2.5. See
also Manual for U.S. Attorneys, supra note 53 (high level participation is a factor in
charging).
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A. ACTORS WHOSE CONDUCT IS IDENTIFIED WITH THE
CORPORATION
At the outset, it is important in the modern multi-layered
ship management and operation environment to correctly identify
the relevant entity is assessing corporate responsibility. For
example, both the STCW and ISM Codes impose certain duties on
the relevant "company." The duties set out in those conventions
and codes are binding on the "company," who may or may not be
the vessel's owner or charterer. Generally, the certificates issued
to the vessel will identify the relevant "company," to whom the
duties under the two conventions and codes will apply.
The distinction between high-level managers, for whom the
corporation bears direct liability, and lower-level employees, for
whom the corporation may be vicariously liable, is easier to state
than to apply. The Model Penal Code defines a "high managerial
agent" in terms of his or her policymaking power:
"high managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation
or an unincorporated association, or, in the case of a
partnership, a partner, or any other agent of a corporation
or association having duties of such responsibility that his
conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of
the corporation or association.9o
By contrast, the Restatement (Third) of Agency concludes, "there
is no rigid test to determine whether an agent is a 'managerial
agent."'91
Useful guidance on the distinction is available in state law.
Under Texas law, for example, those whose actions create direct
liability in the corporation (i.e., the master) include: (a) corporate
officers; (b) those who have authority to employ, direct and
discharge servants of the master; (c) those engaged in the
performance of nondelegable or absolute duties of the master; and
90. Model Penal Code § 2.07(4)(c) (1962).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03, cmt. e, (2006):
the determination should focus on the agent's discretion to make
decisions that would have prevented the injury to the plaintiff or
that determine policies of the organization relevant to the risk that
resulted in the injury. The title that an agent holds is not
dispositive, nor is the fact that the agent is not among the highest
in an organization's hierarchy. If an agent in fact manages a
business or enterprise, the agent is a "managerial agent" of the
principal on whose behalf it manages, although the agent is
external to the principal's own organizational structure.
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(d) those to whom a corporation has confided the management of
the whole or a department or division of its business. 92 Although
mindful of the admonition that it is the persons' function, not
title, that determines whether they fall within the high level
management class, 93 the Texas rule would most likely include
"superintendents" sent out by a ship management company's
headquarters office to supervise a newly acquired vessel's
transition, as was the case with the Cosco Busan.
B. CULPABILITY STANDARD
The culpability standard for proof of a negligent discharge of
oil under the CWA is the so-called "simple negligence" standard,
whether the government relies on a theory of corporate vicarious
liability for negligence by its agents or employees or direct
corporate negligence. As with land-based torts, maritime law
holds that the reasonably perceived risk defines the duty to be
obeyed.94 Said another way, the standard of care must be adapted
to the circumstances, and risk management measures must be
commensurate with the risk assessment. That risk is managed
through a "layered approach," in which a number of, oftentimes,
redundant risk management measures are put in place. The
concept is sometimes visually depicted using layers of Swiss
cheese: a risk vector must find and penetrate a "hole" in all of the
layers before it can strike its target. As the risk increases,
additional layers are erected to prevent its actualization. Some of
those layers plainly fall within the domain of the ship owner or
operator, who must exercise reasonable care, at the systemic or
managerial level, to address foreseeable risks created by the
vessel's operations.
C. THE BASES FOR THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE
The sources for the standard of care in the Cosco Busan case
included the STCW Convention and Code, the SOLAS Convention
92. Corporate Wings, Inc. v. King, 767 S.W. 2d 485, 488 (Tex. App. 1989).
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. e, (2006) (the title that an
agent holds is not dispositive, nor is the fact that the agent is not among the highest
in an organization's hierarchy).
94. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (NY 1928). The standard of
care required of professional mariners is governed not by the general standard, but
rather by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 12 (2010) standard for
"professionals." See Craig H. Allen, Preventing Merchant Vessel Groundings by
Enforcing a Professional Mariner Standard of Care, 63 WASH. L. REV. 371 (1989)
(based on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A).
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and the ISM Code, along with the customary practice of the
shipping industry in implementing the STCW and ISM Codes.
Under those sources, corporate shipowner negligence (or ship
"operator" negligence where responsibility is delegated to an
operating company),95 as distinguished from negligent operation
by the vessel's master, crew or pilot, may be found, inter alia, in a
breach of the owner's duty to exercise reasonable care in: (1)
establishing an adequate company policy on safety and
environmental protection and navigation practices; (2) hiring a
competent master, officers and crew; (3) providing professional
training to the master, officers and crew, including training in the
company's safety and environmental protection policy and
navigation practices; (4) taking reasonable steps, through
inspections, audits, interviews and reviews of logs and records, to
determine whether the master, officers and crew are complying
with applicable legal requirements and relevant company policies
and navigation practices; or (5) ordering timely remedial action
where the owner or operator knows, has reason to know, or
should have known that the master, officers or crew do not
understand or are not complying with the applicable rules,
policies and practices.
An important source of federal law that may be relevant to a
determination of the vessel owner's and operator's duties may be
found in the cases adjudicating ship owners' and charterers' right
to limit liability under U.S. law. The governing federal statute
generally provides a right to limitation where the negligent
conduct causing the harm occurred without the "privity or
knowledge" of the vessel owner or charterer. 96 In effect, a vessel
owner might be able to limit its liability under the respondeat
superior theory, but it cannot do so for its own direct negligence. 97
The parallels between proving a shipowner's privity or knowledge
in limitation actions on the civil-admiralty side and proving an
owner's or operator's direct liability in a criminal case should be
immediately apparent.98 For example, under the "active control"
95. See JAMES J. BUCKLEY, THE BUSINESS OF SHIPPING ch. 10 (8th ed. 2008).
96. See 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b) (2006).
97. See Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911) (owner may not avoid liability
for its own fault or neglect).
98. Like all analogies, the analogy between the privity or knowledge
determination and the direct criminal liability determination must be used with
caution. Limitation actions entail two steps. In the first one, the court determines
whether someone for whom the owner or charterer bears vicarious liability
committed actionable fault. If so, the court in the second step determines whether
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cases involving limitation of liability claims, if an owner or a
managing agent of the owner is in active control of the vessel at
the time the claim arises, privity or knowledge is established.99
The cases applying the limitation of liability statute,
distinguishing as they do "negligence on the bridge" from
"negligence in the home office," are an important reference point
in understanding the distinct obligations of a ship owner.100 For
example, following the M/V Summit Venture's 1980 allision with
the Sunshine Skyway Bridge in Tampa Bay, Florida, resulting in
thirty-five deaths, the federal district court was faced with the
shipowner's petition to limit its liability under the above cited
statute.101 The trial court denied limitation after finding that the
owner had failed to adequately train the vessel's master and crew
in their responsibilities when a harbor pilot was employed, a
relationship defined at the time by a precursor to the STCW Code
cited in Section IV.B of this article.102 A similar limitation action
arose in 2002 when the towboat Robert Y Love allided with the
Interstate 40 bridge over the Arkansas River near Webber Falls,
Oklahoma, killing fourteen motorists. 103
Another important decision that defines the ship owner's or
operator's independent legal obligation regarding safe navigation
of its vessel arises out of a 1965 British case involving the vessel
Lady Gwendolen. The vessel was employed by the Guinness
brewing company to transport fresh ale from Dublin to Liverpool.
that causative fault was within the owner's or charterer's privity or knowledge. See,
e.g., Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant, State of Florida (The Summit Venture), 768
F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1985). For the corporate shipowner, privity or knowledge of the
corporation is deemed established if a managing agent, officer or supervising
employee had privity or knowledge. See, e.g., Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline, 15 F.3d
500 (5th Cir. 1994); Verdin v. C&B Boat Co., Inc. 860 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1988). By
statute, the master's privity or knowledge is imputed to the owner in cases of
personal injury or death, but not for property losses. 46 U.S.C. § 30506(e) (2006).
99. See, e.g., Complaint of Ingoglia, 723 F. Supp. 512 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
100. The distinction is sometimes expressed in terms of strategic negligence (ship
owner's or operator's policies, practices, procedures, hiring, training, auditing
performance, and corrective action), operational negligence (operating manuals,
watch, quarter and station bills used on board vessel, voyage planning), and tactical
negligence in particular cases (means of taking/plotting fixes, a decision to continue
toward bridge even after losing situational awareness).
101. In re Hercules Carriers, 566 F. Supp. 962 (M.D. Fl. 1983). The court also
held that the M/V Summit Venture was unseaworthy because the master and crew
were not adequately trained.
102. Id. at 979-82.
103. In re Magnolia Marine Transp. Co., 301 F. Supp.2d 1283 (E.D. Ok. 2003).
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On one such trip the vessel collided with an anchored vessel in
heavy fog on the River Mersey while operating at full speed. The
court denied the shipowner's petition for limitation of liability
after finding that the owner knew or should have known, by
inspecting the ship's logs, that the vessel often operated at an
excessive speed in fog; and yet, the owner did nothing to correct
the practice. 104 More recently, a British court denied a vessel
owner limitation based on the owner's fault in failing to instruct
and train the master and crew and for inadequate manuals. 105
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit denied limitation to the owner of a
ship that collided with another vessel in fog on the Mississippi
River despite, or perhaps because of, the owner's assertion that it
preferred a "hands off' management approach to its vessel. 06
Although these cases concern statutory limitation of liability,
they ultimately deal with the question of independent fault by the
vessel's management and are, therefore, an important source of
the evolving standard of care applicable to vessel owners and
operators.
1. DUTIES UNDER THE INLAND NAVIGATION RULES
Possible violations of the Inland Navigation Rules by those
on board the Cosco Busan were identified in Section III.B.4.
Violations by the vessel master or crew, but not the pilot, may
give rise to vicarious, but not direct liability. The violations may,
however, be relevant to their competency, and therefore to the
vessel operator's care in selecting them, or to their level of and
need for training.
In a decision subject to some doubt in the modern era, one
court held that a vessel owner owes no duty to instruct
104. The Lady Gwendolen, [19651 1 Lloyd's Rep. 335 (C.A.). Captain Robert Slack
reports that in that case the shipowner offered in its defense a "thick file of letters"
its marine superintendent had sent to the master admonishing him about his
excessive speed in fog. Writing for the court, Justice Hewson, who commanded
destroyers in World War II, responded that the owner could not avoid liability by "a
spate of letters which are often filed and forgotten." Robert Slack, The Seaman's Eye
(presented to the 39th annual meeting of the Institute of Navigation, June 1983)
(copy on file with the author). See also Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks (The
Linseed King), 285 U.S. 502 (1932) (mere instructions to subordinate employees to
comply with company safety directives is not enough to shield owner from liability).
105. The Eurasian Dream, [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 719 (Q.B. Div.).
106. In re Trico Marine Op., Inc., 332 F.3d 779 (5th Cir. 2003); Coryell v. Phipps
(The Seminole), 317 U.S. 406 (1943) (defining outer limits of owner's delegation
options).
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professional mariners on the rules of the road.10 7 Similarly,
another court ruled that failure to train a fishing vessel master
on how to properly use electronic navigation equipment does not
make the vessel owner fully liable for an allision nor does it
prevent the vessel owner from limiting its liability-at least when
there is insufficient evidence to prove that such failure to train
was the cause of the allision. 108 While both conclusions might be
legally justified under their facts, for vessels not subject to the
STCW and ISM Codes, even with vessels not governed by the
STCW and ISM Codes, the owner does have a duty to hire a
competent master and crew, and a competent master and crew
should not require instruction by the owner on the rules of the
road. Additionally, it now seems well established that a vessel
owner does have a duty to familiarize new crew members with
the vessel's navigation equipment before sending them out to
operate the vessel on the public waters.
The principle established by the Lady Gwendolen case cited
above also makes it clear that an owner or operator may be found
negligent under a direct liability theory, and denied limitation of
civil liability, where the owner or operator knew or should have
known that the vessel master or watch officers violated the rules
by, for example, operating at an excessive speed, keeping an
inadequate look-out or in not using all means appropriate to
determine if risk of collision exists, while taking no corrective
action. In some cases, such conduct might even rise to the level of
willful blindness, establishing knowledge. 109
2. OPERATOR ("COMPANY") DUTIES UNDER THE STCW CODE
The 1978 Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchstanding of Seafarers (STCW) and its accompanying
107. Matheny v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 557 F.3d 311, 320 (6th Cir. 2009).
108. In re Omega Protein, 548 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2008). The court found that the
vessel was equipped with an electronic chart that had an obstruction warning
system. The vessel owner had not provided the master with training in use of the
electronic chart system and he had never read the operating manual. Evidence
indicated, however, that there were so many offshore rigs in that part of the Gulf of
Mexico that the master would not have received an effective warning of the
obstruction even if he had known how to properly use the navigation equipment.
109. Evidence that the defendant acted with willful blindness, conscious
avoidance or deliberate ignorance-which means the defendant deliberately closed
his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious-can be used to prove
knowledge, not merely negligence. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131
S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
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Code, 110 which evolved from an earlier IMO resolution, entered
into force in 1984. The 1978 Convention and Code were amended
in 1995 and again in 2010.111 The United States is a party to the
Convention and its Code. 112 In the U.S., STCW applies to
mariners employed on vessels greater than 200 gross register
tons (domestic tonnage), or 500 gross tons (International Tonnage
Convention tonnage), operating seaward of the boundary lines.113
Significantly, the STCW Convention imposes specific obligations
on the "company,"114 which is defined as the "owner of the ship or
any organization or person such as the manager, or the bareboat
charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation of the
ship from the shipowner and who, on assuming such
responsibility, has agreed to take over all the duties and
responsibilities imposed on the company by these regulations."1 15
The STCW Convention, thus, permits the owner to delegate
responsibility, but does not envision that it can be further
delegated beyond the operator. 1 16
STCW Convention Regulation 1/14 sets out the
"responsibilities of companies" under the STCW Code. The STCW
Code is, in turn, divided into two parts. Part A contains
mandatory provisions, while Part B consists of "recommended"
guidance, which includes recommendations on Bridge Resource
110. Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchstanding of
Seafarers [STCW], Dec. 1, 1978, 1361 U.N.T.S. 190.
111. See 1995 Amendments to the Annex of the Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, Jul. 7, 1995, Sen.
Exec. Doc. EE 96-1, C.T.I.A. No. 7624. The convention was again substantially
amended in 2010. These "Manila" amendments became effective Jan. 1, 2012);
however, those amendments post-date the Cosco Busan incident. For a summary of
the 2010 Manila Amendments see http://www.uscg.mil/nmdannouncements/
brochure/stcw.pdf.
112. See also U.S. Coast Guard, Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 4-
97, Guidance on Company Rules and Responsibilities under the 1995 Amendments to
the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping (STCW), COMDTPUB P16700.4 (1997), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/nvic/pdf/1997/n4-97.pdf. Implementing federal
regulations were codified at 46 C.F.R. §§ 15.1101 - .1111 (2011).
113. 46 C.F.R. § 15.1101 (2011). The "boundary lines" are prescribed in 46 C.F.R.
pt. 7. Vessels operating seaward of those lines are deemed "seagoing" vessels.
114. See, e.g., STCW Convention, supra note 110, Reg. 1/14.
115. Id. at Reg. 1/1.23.
116. The question whether an owner may also be found guilty on a "negligent
entrustment" theory for delegating management responsibility to an incompetent
company is beyond the scope of this article.
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Management. 117 The mandatory provisions of the STCW Code
require the company to, inter alia, ensure that the obligations set
out in Section A of the Code are given full and complete effect,
and to provide written instructions to the master setting forth the
policies and procedures to be followed. 118
Chapter VIII of the STCW Code sets out the standards
regarding watchkeeping. These watchkeeping practices overlap
with, but are distinct from, the U.S. Navigation Safety
Regulations cited above. The Code includes requirements
regarding passage planning, principles to be observed in keeping
a navigational watch, performance of the navigational watch,
watchkeeping in restricted visibility and in congested waters and
navigation with a pilot on board. The Convention and its Code
were originally adopted in 1978, giving ship owners and operators
more than thirty years to incorporate the STCW architecture into
their fleet navigation policies, manuals, standard operating
procedures and training programs.
Early federal decisions, including at least one by the U.S.
Supreme Court, described an embarked pilot as the "temporary
master" of the piloted vessel and set strict limits on the master's
power to override the pilot's decisions." 9 Those early cases have
been superseded in part by U.S. accession to the STCW
Convention and Code. The relevance of international standards
for watchkeeping now codified in the STCW Code was highlighted
in the M/V Summit Venture bridge allision case cited above. One
of the principles made clear in the STCW Code is the relationship
between a vessel's master and crew and an embarked pilot.
Recognizing that a layered safety management approach entails
shared navigation responsibility, section A-VIII/2, part 3-1
(paragraphs 49-50) establishes the following rule:
49. Despite the duties and obligations of pilots, their
presence on board does not relieve the master or officer in
charge of the navigational watch of their duties and
117. The fact that Part B is denominated "recommended guidance" is now
misleading in light of ISM Code, para. 1.2.3.2, which requires the company's safety
management system to "ensure" that applicable IMO guidelines are taken into
account.
118. STCW Code, supra note 110, Section A-1/14.
119. Cooley v. Bd. Wardens of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299, 316 (1851). But see Ralli
v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386, 402 (1895) ("the master still has the duty of seeing to the
safety of the ship"). See generally ALEX J. PARKS & EDWARD V. CATTELL JR., THE LAW
OF TUGS, TOW, AND PILOTAGE 1003-10 (3d ed. 1994).
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obligations for the safety of the ship. The master and pilot
shall exchange information regarding navigation
procedures, local conditions and the ship's characteristics.
The master and/or the officer in charge of the navigational
watch shall co-operate closely with the pilot and maintain
an accurate check on the ship's position and movement
(emphasis added).
50. If in any doubt as to the pilot's actions or intentions,
the officer in charge of the navigational watch shall seek
clarification from the pilot and, if doubt still exists, shall
notify the master immediately and take whatever action is
necessary before the master arrives.
A 2003 resolution by the IMO reaffirms these principles and
adds that "[m]asters and bridge officers have a duty to support
the pilot and to ensure that his/her actions are monitored at all
times."120 The rule is grounded on a sound empirical record. Ship
owners and operators who dispatch their vessels to ports
throughout the world know full well that pilot competency varies
greatly from one location to another; 121 and even from one pilot to
another within the same port. Shipowners know that vessel
navigation and collision avoidance equipment vary by
manufacturer and even model, particularly in the location of
equipment controls and their displays. Ship owners also know
that no one is more familiar with the ship's equipment and
operational procedures than the master and crew, and certainly
not the pilot, who in some ports compensates for this by bringing
a specially equipped laptop computer, sometimes referred to as a
"personal pilot unit" or PPV, aboard.12 2
The pilot is selected for his or her knowledge of the pilotage
grounds, not of the vessel, its equipment or crew. If the ship is to
120. IMO, Recommendations on training and certification and operational
procedures for maritime pilots other than deep-sea pilots, IMO Resolution A.960(23)
(2003), annex 2, para. 2.3 (emphasis added).
121. See JOHN MCPHEE, LOOKING FOR A SHIP 222 (1990) (reporting that the ship's
master could "see a courtroom of lawyers" reflected in a nonchalant and
inexperienced pilot's eyes).
122. In Puget Sound, for example, roughly twenty percent of the pilots use
personal pilot unit (PPU) laptops. Delmar Mackenzie, After Cosco Busan: A Fresh
Look at Safety in Puget Sound, PACIFIC MARITIME, Aug. 2008, at 30-32. Obviously, a
pilot using a PPU will have a different operating picture than the vessel's crew and
will likely relate to the bridge team and bridge equipment differently than a pilot not
so equipped.
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be navigated with precautions appropriate to the prevailing
circumstances, the shipowner must ensure the master and crew
are fully integrated into, and engaged in, vessel navigation and
collision avoidance at all times, even while a pilot is aboard.
Therefore, a prudent shipowner prescribes a policy requiring a
thorough master-pilot exchange of information: the vessel
provides the pilot with, among other things, information on the
vessel's maneuvering characteristics, while the pilot provides the
owner with what some pilots' associations call a "navigation"
plan. 123 Any differences between the passage plan prepared by
the vessel and the pilot's intended navigation plan, or later
changes to the navigation plan, must be reconciled. The master-
pilot information exchange is designed to facilitate a shared
understanding of the risk factors and risk management
considerations. The "exchange" continues throughout the transit
over the pilotage grounds. As the vessel's crew maintains its
"accurate check" on the vessel's position and movement, it reports
its findings to the pilot and to the master. 124 A shipowner who
fails to establish a policy and standard operating procedures
requiring such practices is negligent, as is one who fails to ensure
compliance with such policies and procedures.
3. OPERATOR ("COMPANY") DUTIES UNDER
SOLAS AND THE ISM CODE
SOLAS Regulation V/34 on passage, or voyage, planning,
which was added to SOLAS in 2002 and generally incorporates a
123. Elements of the master-pilot exchange are described in IMO Resolution
A.960(23) (2003), annex 2, para. 5. The resolution distinguishes between "passage
planning" as part of the master-pilot exchange, and the independent requirement for
berth-to-berth "voyage planning" under SOLAS Regulation V/34, STCW Code Section
A-VIII/2, Part 2 and IMO Resolution A.893(21). A compliant SMS and its related
fleet navigation procedures would ensure that ISM-covered vessels complied with
these sound and prudent navigation planning practices. Maritime Administrations,
such as the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch, now carefully scrutinize the
master-pilot exchange in the course of marine casualty investigations. In addition,
the Nautical Institute has published several excellent guides and monographs that
might be considered relevant "learned treatises," which accurately collect industry
custom or prudent practices, or evidence of "good seamanship" practice under Rule 2
of the Rules of the Road that an expert might rely on in forming an opinion or
inference. See, e.g., THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE ON PILOTAGE AND SHIPHANDLING, 10,
11-13 (1990); THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE ON COMMAND, 33-39, 114-17, 142-47, 189-93
(2000).
124. See Craig H. Allen, Fixing Responsibility for Pilot Navigation, 7 PROF.
MARINER 15 (1994) (condemning the failure by vessel officers and crews to meet their
NSR and STCW obligations while a pilot is aboard).
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1999 IMO resolution, imposes a duty on the master to "ensure
that the intended voyage has been planned using the appropriate
nautical charts and nautical publications for the area concerned,
taking into account the guidelines and recommendations
developed by the [IMO]." 12 5 The area of "concern" is understood to
extend from "berth-to-berth";12 6 that is, from the point where the
vessel gets underway from a pier or anchorage until it arrives at
the destination pier or anchorage, and expressly includes "those
areas where the services of a pilot will be used."127 Passage
planning is divided into four stages: appraisal, planning,
execution and monitoring. 128 During the planning stage, the
vessel's navigator plots tracklines and waypoints for the voyage
and establishes "the method and frequency of position fixing,
including primary and secondary options, and the indication of
areas where accuracy of position fixing is critical and maximum
reliability must be obtained." This requirement recognizes that
without pre-established tracklines and waypoints, the vessel's
bridge navigation team has no effective means of complying with
their obligations to independently verify the vessel's navigation
safety by comparing the vessel's actual position to the intended
track, to determine the time to turn onto a new trackline or to
avoid navigational dangers through parallel indexing and danger
ranges/bearings. SOLAS Regulation V/34 works hand-in-hand
with similar risk assessment and management measures set out
in STCW Code section A-VIII/2, part 2 (voyage planning).
Since its entry into force in 1998 as an amendment to the
SOLAS Convention, the International Safety Management (ISM)
Code formally mandates implementation of a "quality
management" systems approach for merchant vessel safety and
environmental protection, similar to the more familiar systems
under the ISO 9000 and 14000 series of standards. 129 The ISM
125. SOLAS, supra note 26, Reg. V134.
126. Among the IMO "guidelines and recommendations" that must be taken into
account under SOLAS Reg. V/34 are Guidelines for Voyage Planning, IMO Res.
A.893(21) (1999). Paragraph 1.3 of that resolution establishes the berth-to-berth
scope of the planning process.
127. Id. para. 2.2 (emphasis added).
128. IMO Res. A.893(21) supra note 126. Resolutions by the International
Maritime Organization may constitute part of the "generally accepted international
regulations, procedures and practices" flag states must conform to under article 94 of
the Law of the Sea Convention. See UNCLOS, supra note 20, art. 94(5).
129. The ISM Code was adopted by IMO resolution in 1993. See IMO,
International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution
Prevention [ISM Code], IMO Res. A.741(18) (1993). The ISM Code is set out in the
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Code overlaps with industry standards and codes, such as the 60-
page Code of Shipmanagement Standards (CSS) promulgated by
the International Ship Manager's Association (InterManager), 130
and which may constitute evidence of the customary practice of
the industry to be used in determining the standard of care.131
The ISM Code imposes specific requirements on both the
vessel master1 32 and the "company" that owns or operates covered
vessels; however, the U.S. implementing statute substitutes
"responsible person" for "company".133 The impetus behind the
Code was the finding in a number of marine casualty
investigations that too many maritime operators lacked a safety
"culture" or "system," and that risk identification, assessment and
management must begin with the entity in the best position to
create such a culture and safety management system-the vessel
owner or operator. 134 As described earlier, the central pillar of the
navigational component of a comprehensive and properly
integrated safety management system is a layered defense, with
safety responsibilities shared by the owner, operator, master,
Annex to Appendix 1 of the resolution. Amendments to the SOLAS Convention,
including adding Chapter IX, were set out in Appendix 2. The ISM Code is
implemented in the United States by 46 U.S.C. ch. 32 and 33 C.F.R. pt. 96 (2011).
See generally USCG Safety Management System Manual Guidebook, available at
www.uscg.mil/pvs/docs/ISM/SMSGuide.doc.
130. InterManager's members subsequently determined that ISO 9001:2000
encompasses the ISMA Code elements, thus obviating a separate industry-specific
code. The organization does, however, publish industry-specific interpretations of the
ISO standards for its members. See InterManager, History, available at
http://www.intermanager.org/about/history/.
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 13 (2010). See also Buckley, THE
BUSINESS OF SHIPPING, supra note 95 (which devotes chapter 10 to a description of
the function served by "vessel management companies"). One source of information
concerning the practices of ship management companies is the periodical Lloyd's
Ship Manager.
132. See ISM Code, supra note 129, section 5. The company defines and
documents the master's responsibility. Id. at section 5.1. In discharging his or her
obligations under the Code, the master is to coordinate with the company's
Designated Person.
133. Id. paras. 3-12. As with the STCW Convention and Code, the ISM Code
defines the "company" as the "owner of the ship or any organization or person such
as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for
operation of the ship from the shipowner and who, on assuming such responsibility,
has agreed to take over all the duties and responsibilities imposed by the ISM Code."
See SOLAS Reg. IX/1.2. See also 33 C.F.R. § 96.120(a) (2011). The Interim Safety
Management Certificate for the Cosco Busan listed Fleet as the "company."
134. For a summary of the company's ISM obligations see Craig H. Allen, The
ISM Code and Shipowner Records: Shared Safety Goals vs. Industry's Privacy Needs,
11 U.S.F MAR. L. J. 1 (1999).
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officers and crew, as well as the pilot when embarked, the vessel's
flag state and the port state, which may provide aids to
navigation and traffic information and/or control systems. An
effective system builds in redundancy, with backup equipment,
fixes determined independently by two position fixing methods,
etc., to guard against a single point failure. The greater the risk,
the more numerous andlor elaborate the protective layers must
be. Risk management and loss control experts with vessel
classification societies and marine insurers stand ready to assist
vessel owners and operators in designing and implementing an
effective safety management system.
The ISM Code requires the company to assign a Designated
Person (DP, DPA for "Designated Person Ashore"), and prescribes
the DPA's duties. 135 The DPA serves as the conduit between the
vessel and the company. The DPA has the responsibility to
monitor the safety and pollution prevention aspects of the
operation of each ship. The central importance of the DPA in
assessing whether a "company" acted negligently cannot be over-
emphasized. 136 "Hands-off' management of merchant vessels is
no longer tolerated, nor can an owner turn a convenient blind eye
to unsafe practices on its vessel. The ISM Code imposes a duty to
inquire. The DPA provides the "link between the company and
those on board" and he or she must have "direct access to the
highest level of management."137
An ISM Code-compliant Safety Management System (SMS)
will include provisions for safe navigation (e.g., compliance with
the applicable rules of the road, STCW Code and any similar
requirements for the specific waters like the U.S. Navigation
Safety Regulations, passage planning, responsibilities for
navigation, additional risk management measures to be employed
in restricted visibility and congested waters, etc.). 38 A properly
135. ISM Code, supra note 129, at para. 4.
136. As Lord Donaldson, author of the pathbreaking 1994 Safer Ships, Cleaner
Seas report to the UK government following the grounding of, and massive oil spill
by, the tanker Braer, pointed out shortly after the ISM Code entered into force, with
the advent of ISM, there will now often be two levels of inquiry: negligence by those
on the ship and negligence on the part of the shipowner in implementing a compliant
Safety Management System (i.e., negligence by management that sets the conditions
for negligence on the ship). John F. Donaldson, The ISM Code: the Road to
Discovery?, [19981 LLOYDS MAR. & COM. L. Q. 526-34.
137. ISM Code, supra note 129, at para. 4.
138. Such additional measures include a requirement for a detailed berth-to-
berth passage plan with pre-established waypoints and decision considerations
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trained DPA for the Company, exercising reasonable care in
carrying out his or her duties, will inspect the vessel's logs and
make appropriate inquiries to ascertain whether the vessel was
complying with the company's SMS and other required practices.
Failure to establish, implement and verify compliance with the
safety management system constitutes a breach of the duty to
exercise due care.
VI. THE CASE STUDY: PROVING DIRECT
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Section IV of the article identified ship owner and operator
duties that might be relevant in determining criminal liability for
a negligently caused discharge of oil under a direct corporate
liability theory. This section draws on the Cosco Busan accident
reports by the NTSB, Coast Guard and Board of Pilot
Commissioners, together with the accompanying public
documents and press reports (collectively, the "case study"), to
demonstrate how those duties might be applied in a particular
case. It is again emphasized that this case study draws on agency
investigative reports or stipulations by the defendant, as part of
the plea agreement, that were never tested at trial. It is also
important to keep in mind that the indictment named only Fleet,
and the compulsory pilot; so, the vessel's owner, classification
society and other entities whose acts or omissions might have
contributed to the allision and oil spill are not examined here. 139
This section will also not attempt an examination of those officers
or employees whose conduct would be directly identified with the
operator of the Cosco Busan. Among those who might represent
"management," for whom the vessel's operator (i.e., the company)
might bear direct liability, are, of course, directors and officers of
attached to each, a pre-departure navigation brief for the bridge team to review the
navigator's track lines, and the use of parallel index lines and/or danger
ranges/bearings, as appropriate. See RICHARD A. CAHILL, STRANDINGS AND THEIR
CAUSES ch. 12 app.1, ch. 13-14 (2002); ROBERT J. MEURON, WATCHSTANDING GUIDE
FOR THE MERCHANT OFFICER 46-57 (1990). They might also include anything from
delaying the vessel departure until visibility improves, to setting a slower speed,
deploying an enhanced navigation team and maintaining closer than normal
coordination with the VTS. Prudent companies might even direct their ship's crew to
set up two redundant navigation/collision avoidance teams.
139. Had this case not been disposed of by plea agreement it might have been
fruitful to explore the classification society's conduct in issuing the vessel's Safety
Management System certificate on October 25, 2007, and the question whether
evidence regarding Fleet's competency as a ship management company also raised
questions of negligent entrustment of a merchant vessel by the vessel's owner.
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the company, but it might also include the company's
superintendents who embarked on the vessel1 40 and the DPA
named in the vessel's Safety Management System. In fact, a
persuasive argument might have been made that the presence of
two on-board Fleet superintendents for most of the voyage placed
the vessel under the "active control" of Fleet during the voyage.
The publicly available record was not adequate to assess the
actual function served by those individuals, as the relevant legal
test for determining whether they were a "high managerial
agent" would require.
A. FLEET'S SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
MANUALS WERE DEFICIENT
Fleet prepared several manuals for the Cosco Busan that
served as the foundation for the company's ISM Code-required
Safety Management System (SMS), including a Bridge
Procedures Manual and a Shipboard Management Manual.141
Those manuals appeared to adequately reflect the applicable
standard of care required in merchant vessel navigation matters;
however, the Coast Guard concluded that the SMS fell short in
several respects.142
The Fleet manuals comprising the vessel's SMS that were
available in the public record incorporated many of the policies
and practices required by SOLAS and the mandatory STCW and
ISM Codes. The manuals also constituted evidence that Fleet and
its on-board superintendents had knowledge of those
international standards and the duties they assigned to Fleet as
the relevant company. Accordingly, the policies and procedures
set out in Fleet's manuals would be relevant in assessing whether
Fleet breached its duty of due care under the general maritime
law. Fleet also had an independent legal obligation under SOLAS
and the ISM Code to implement and monitor compliance with its
approved SMS. A breach of that obligation might constitute
statutory fault, the maritime analogue to negligence per se. As
140. One was described as Fleet's 'Marine Superintendent" and the second was
described as Fleet's "Technical Superintendent."
141. The vessel's SMS was extensively discussed in the NTSB U.S. Coast Guard
investigation reports. Selected provisions were also posted on the NTSB's public
document web site.
142. See U.S. Coast Guard Report, supra note 24, at 31 (concluding that there
was evidence that the SMS was "inadequate with respect to bridge management
team principles, voyage planning, crew indoctrination, and procedures for navigation
in restricted visibility").
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the following section will explain, had Fleet exercised reasonable
care in implementing and monitoring compliance with its SMS,
and those particular provisions governing the vessel's navigation
planning and execution, the 2007 allision would likely have been
prevented.
B. FLEET'S CONDUCT BREACHED THE STANDARD
OF CARE AND ITS OWN SMS
The evidence available in this case would almost certainly
have demonstrated that Fleet's conduct, like the conduct of the
owners of the M/V Summit Venture, fell well short of what would
have been "reasonable" under the circumstances and below the
now-common practice of merchant vessel operators in
establishing safety policies, prescribing navigation practices,
ensuring the adequacy of related master and crew-training, and
in verifying, through inquiry, inspection and examinations, the
vessel's compliance. 143
In assessing negligence in this case it is important to note
that the "risk to be perceived" in sending a ship to a congested
port notorious for its frequent fog is not only that which came to
pass on that 2007 morning, a glancing blow that nevertheless
resulted in a major oil spill in a water body with incalculable
environmental, economic and aesthetic value, but rather the sum
of all risks posed by a 900 foot long vessel with up to two million
gallons of fuel oil groping its way through dense fog near one of
the most heavily traveled bridges in America. The consequences
could have been much worse. Using Judge Hand's deceptively
simple calculus, the probability of an allision or other casualty,
such as a collision with another vessel, might not be large, but
143. An example of customary industry practice can be found in the recently
published company navigation policies and practices for an ECDIS-equipped cruise
ship reported in the July 2008 issue of the Journal of Navigation, which is published
by the Royal Institute of Navigation. See Nick Nash, A Modern Day Cruise Ship
Master's "Captain's Navigation Orders," 61 J. NAV. 547-556 (2008) (describing a
multi-layered navigational risk management system that, among other things,
defines requirements for passage planning with waypoints and the associated
decision factors, the subsidiary role of embarked pilots, and the role of all bridge
team members in making "go/no go" risk decisions). See also NAUTICAL INSTITUTE,
MANAGING RISK IN SHIPPING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1999) (distinguishing the
company's role in managing shipping risks from that of the master and crew); A.J.
SwiFT, BRIDGE TEAM MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 2004). Since 1997, tanker owners and
operators have been required by federal regulation to adopt bridge resource
management. Bridge Resource Management Policy and Procedures, 33 C.F.R. §
157.415 (2011). The ISM Code effectively requires non-tankers to do the same.
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the magnitude of the potential loss, as demonstrated by the
Sunshine Skyway Bridge tragedy, calls for extra-ordinary risk
management measures, including the obvious measure to remain
safely at the dock, which was the measure apparently chosen by
four other ships that faced similar conditions that morning.144
Ship owners, and the ship owners' SMS, must provide the master
and crew with a clear policy and instructions on how such risks
are to be assessed and managed, and on when a master in doubt
should exercise independent judgment and/or consult with the
ship's operator or its DPA.
Had the case gone to trial, the examination of whether Fleet
breached the standard of care could have been organized into six
areas, including the company's:
*Failure to exercise due care in hiring a competent master
and mates,
*Failure to exercise due care in training the Cosco Busan's
master and mates,
eFailure to exercise due care in implementing the required
safety management system,
*Failure to exercise due care in supervising the vessel's
navigation planning,
*Failure to exercise due care in assigning sufficient
navigation personnel for restricted waters, and
*Failure to exercise due care in supervising execution of
navigation plans and procedures.
In examining the available evidence, several facts stand out:
(1) the Cosco Busan master and all other officers and crew
members other than the chief engineer reported aboard the ship
in Busan, Korea on October 24, 2007, the day before the vessel
got underway for California; 145 (2) the vessel's crew list shows
that when the ship sailed for California it carried, in addition to
144. The decision by those vessels is consistent with the guidelines established by
the San Francisco, San Pablo and Suisan Bay Harbor Safety Plan [HSP], Section XIV
of which provides that "[vlessels within the Bay at a dock ... shall not commence
movement if visibility is less and .5 nautical miles throughout the intended route,
unless the operator's assessment of all variables is that the vessel can proceed
safely." HSP, supra, at 5 and 43, quoted in NTSB Report, supra note 22, at 79.
145. NTSB Report, supra note 22, at 46.
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the master, officers and crew, two company "superintendents"
and that at least one of the superintendents did not leave the ship
until immediately before it got underway from Oakland on the
morning of the allision. 146 The presence of the company's
superintendents on board the vessel provided Fleet with actual or
constructive knowledge of the conduct on board the ship and an
opportunity-indeed a duty-to take reasonable and timely
corrective action, thus converting what might otherwise be a
question of vicarious liability of a principal for the conduct of its
agents to one of direct liability for a breach of the
principal's/employer's independent duty to exercise reasonable
care in the face of a known risk. 147
1. FAILURE TO EXERCISE DUE CARE IN HIRING
A COMPETENT MASTER AND MATES
The available evidence suggests Fleet breached its duty to
exercise reasonable care by hiring a master who did not
understand his duties as master of a 900 foot cargo vessel under
SOLAS, the ISM and STCW Codes, the U.S. Navigation Safety
Regulations, 148 or even the company's own Safety Management
System manuals. The master sailed from Busan without a
passage plan, 149 an omission that could not have escaped the
attention of Fleet's on-board marine superintendent. It could be
inferred from the master's stated level of deference to the pilot on
the morning of the allision and his explanation for why he
decided to get underway that morning, despite the dangerous
conditions, or to depart Busan despite the complete lack of
navigation planning or navigation team training, that rather
than select a master who would exercise the kind of independent
judgment called for by the governing legal codes, Fleet chose a
master who could be counted on to put the company's business
priorities first. The exchange with the pilot over the ECDIS
symbols for the bridge span also strongly suggests that either the
master did not understand one of the most important features of
this critical piece of navigation equipment or did not have a
sufficient grasp of English to understand and answer the pilot's
question. Either fact would cast doubt on the master's
146. See NTSB Interview of Captain Parminder Singh, Nov. 16, 2007, at pp. 8-9,
available on the NTSB DMS web site, supra note 16.
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 7.03(1), 7.05, 7.06 (2006) (liability
of principal).
148. See, e.g., SOLAS, supra note 26, Regs. V/34, V/34-1 & XI-2/8.
149. This violated STCW Code section A-V111/2.
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competency-as measured by the heightened standard of care for
professionals-to command a 900 foot commercial ship in U.S.
waters.
The evidence also suggests that Fleet failed to exercise
reasonable care in selecting a competent second mate. On
merchant ships, the second mate typically serves as the navigator
and is the ship's navigation expert who is responsible for passage
planning. The evidence suggests that in this case the mate Fleet
selected did not understand the international requirement for
berth-to-berth passage planning. It also suggests that the mate
was unfamiliar with critical bridge equipment, including, for
example, the vessel's VDR and with the principles of Racon.15 0
2. FAILURE TO EXERCISE DUE CARE IN TRAINING
THE Cosco BuSAN'S MASTER AND MATES
The days when a vessel owner or operator could meet its
obligations by simply verifying that all vessel crew members hold
a valid license or certificate for the particular capacity in which
they are employed are long gone. Indeed, as one court recently
explained:
A key contributing factor to the crew's incompetence and
hence the vessel's unseaworthiness is the absence of any
meaningful training or the implementation of proper
procedures for the safe navigation of the vessel . . . . Mr.
Henry had the utmost faith in his men to independently
avail themselves of the latest safety and navigational
information. While he avers that he made all Coast Guard
regulations available to his crew on his vessels, he made
no effort to assure that these manuals were ever read, and
the Court believes that they rarely were read. Mr. Henry
placed great reliance on the crew members keeping
abreast of safety and navigational information pursuant to
their license renewal requirements which occurred every
five years instead of training them himself. Henry
Marine's reliance on others to train its crew for it
represents negligent manning of the vessel. The Court
150. Racon (RAdar beCON) is a radar transponder used to mark maritime
navigational hazards. When a Racon receives a radar pulse from a ship's radar, it
responds with a distinctive signal, which generates a short line of dots and dashes
forming a Morse character radiating away from the location of the beacon on the
vessel's radar display.
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finds that Henry Marine provided inadequate training to
its crews on all levels from the deckhands through to
captain which contributed to the unseaworthiness of the
Mary Sue. 15 1
In the 21st century, the vessel owner or operator has an
ongoing duty to ensure that the crew it employs is competent in
the particular type of ship and its equipment and procedures, as
set out in documents like the Bridge Procedures Manual and
Captain's Standing Orders. Additionally, a crew employed to sail
to a foreign port must be given sufficient training to comply with
local rules for that country and port. The STCW and ISM Code
address some of those needs through their requirement for
familiarization training. Specifically, companies are required to
ensure that seafarers who are newly assigned to a ship are
familiarized with their specific duties and with all ship
arrangements, installations, equipment, procedures and ship
characteristics that are relevant to their routine or emergency
duties. 152 Written instructions are to be issued by the company to
each ship to ensure this ship-specific familiarization takes
place.153 Fleet's SMS for the Cosco Busan does, in fact, include
such a requirement.154
The available evidence suggests Fleet failed to exercise due
care in training its master and mates for their assignment aboard
the Cosco Busan. The company's decision to bring the master and
all of the deck officers (chief, second and third mates) aboard the
day before the ship got underway-barely providing them with
enough time to stow their gear and find their way to the bridge-
before sailing on a 5,300 mile voyage to California created a
dangerous and stressful situation. The master and mates had
apparently been ashore for a considerable period of time, up to six
months, and had not served together. An operator exercising
reasonable care would have utilized classroom and/or simulator
training tools to familiarize the new crew with the Cosco Busan's
151. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co. Limitations Proceedings: Barge NL 251, 1997 AMC
1432 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
152. See NTSB Report, supra note 22, at 28 (citing the ISM Code requirement); 46
C.F.R. §§ 15.405, 15.1105(b) (2011) (citing STCW Reg. 1/14).
153. See Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 4-97, supra note 112,
enclosure 2.
154. See Fleet Management, Ltd., Shipboard Management Manual, Jun. 1, 2001,
section 6, para. 6.4.2 available at http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F44500-44999%2F
44544%2F402082.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
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equipment. It would also have built in enough time for them to
study the company's SMS, Bridge Procedures Manual and
Master's Standing Orders, at least some of which were written in
English, which was not the crew's native language.155
Experience has persuasively demonstrated the need to
provide an opportunity for the new crew to engage in "bridge
team" training to learn the various navigation details of the
duties to which they will be assigned. Effective bridge team
performance requires that each team member understand not
only his own duties, but also the duties of the other team
members and what those team members are expecting from him.
Although there is some debate whether an embarked pilot is a
"member" of the bridge team, 15 6 all reasonably prudent ship
operators would agree that the bridge team that will be expected
to operate the vessel in restricted waters with a pilot aboard must
understand their individual role, the pilot's role vis-A-vis the
master and watch officer (under the STCW) and their role in
supporting the pilot in navigation, collision avoidance,
communications and course and speed maneuvers (under the
Navigation Safety Regulations and STCW). 15 7
Fleet's failure to train the master and crew might have been
attributable in part to the questionable competence of Fleet's
senior management. For example, a published statement by a
Fleet general manager after the allision manifested a serious
misunderstanding of the modern international standards
155. See NTSB Report, supra note 22, at 125 & 137 (Recommendation M-09-7).
156. See American Pilots' Association, Pilotage in the United States: Role of the
Pilot, available at http://www.americanpilots.org/PilotagelnUS.aspx (last visited
Mar. 3, 2012) (taking the position that the embarked pilot is not a member of the
vessel's bridge team).
157. Statements by senior Fleet representative, Captain Nagarajan, who was
listed as Fleet's "party representative" in the NTSB proceedings, that the Cosco
Busan "master might have assessed that if the port is open and the pilot says it's
good to go . . . he might have followed the advice of the pilot and got underway"
demonstrate that neither the company nor the master understood the vessel's
obligation to exercise independent judgment regarding critical navigation safety
decisions. Captain Nagarajan was quoted in Dom Yanchunas, Pilot lost situational
awareness in thick fog, NTSB told, PROFESSIONAL MARINER (June/July 2008),
available at http://www.professionalmariner.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=420C4D38
DC9C4E3A903315CDDC65AD72&nm=Archives&type=Publishing&mod=Publication
s%3A%3AArticle&mid=8F3A7027421841978Fl8BE895F87F791&tier=4&id=678302
8F680B4C5884538A8B3C383E26. Such a passive approach is wholly inconsistent
with the principles of prudent risk-based management that are now an integral
component of the contemporary standard of care.
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governing the master-pilot relationship. Specifically, he was
quoted as saying that the master will take control from the pilot
only if the pilot is "manifestly in distress or manifestly
incompetent." 15 8 The general manager's statement is contrary to
the STCW and appears to even be inconsistent with the vessel's
SMS provided by the company.159 It will be recalled that the
vessel owner's failure to train its master and crew in an earlier
version of this vessel-pilot relationship standard set out in a
resolution by the IMO was decisive in the M/V Summit Venture-
Sunshine Skyway Bridge allision case. Even more telling of the
company's failure to prescribe or ensure compliance with these
standards is the apparent failure to prepare a passage plan for
this voyage, or for prior voyages to Los Angeles/Long Beach.
3. FAILURE TO EXERCISE DUE CARE IN IMPLEMENTING
THE REQUIRED SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The ISM Code calls upon the company to develop, implement
and maintain a safety management system (SMS), which
includes, inter alia, "instructions and procedures to ensure safe
operation of ships and protection of the marine environment in
compliance with international and flag State legislation."1 6 0 The
company must ensure the master is "fully conversant" with the
SMS161 and that the ship's personnel are familiarized with the
SMS and their duties. Compliance with the SMS provisions is to
be verified by internal audits and management reviews. This ISM
Code provision imposes an obligation on the company to provide
instructions and procedures to ensure its ship complies with the
STCW Code and that it verifies compliance through internal
audits and management reviews.
The ISM Code also requires the company to establish
procedures for the preparation of plans and instructions for key
shipboard operations concerning the safety of the ship and
prevention of pollution, and to assign tasks to qualified
personnel. 162 A compliant plan will provide clear direction to the
master and crew on vessel navigation safety (e.g., passage
planning and position fixing), the role of the master and officers
158. Id.
159. Fleet's SMS for the Cosco Busan stated that the pilot "acts only as an
advisor." See NTSB Report, supra note 22, at 66.
160. ISM Code, supra note 129, at para. 1.4.
161. Id. at para. 6.1.
162. Id., at para. 7.
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and their relationship to embarked pilots, and additional
precautions to be observed in congested waters or during periods
of restricted visibility.
Fleet's conduct leading up to the day of the allision
demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward the ISM-required
principles of safe ship management. 163 The crew, who sailed the
ship from Korea to the United States the day after reporting
aboard, surely understood that this company put profits ahead of
safety. No ship operator exercising reasonable care would have
believed the crew could be trained to the level of minimally
required competency the day after reporting aboard by studying
voluminous manuals in a foreign language. The fact that Fleet's
classification society, Germanischer Lloyd, certified after its pre-
audit inspection on October 24th that the master and officers
where "familiar with" the SMS and the planned arrangements for
its implementation on the very same day that they reported
aboard is manifestly implausible. 6 4
Lacking any formal on-board training organization, process
or instructors, Fleet appears to have relied on the master and
officers' representation that they viewed a "training video" to
fulfill Fleet's obligation to provide adequate training. Finally, in
evaluating whether Fleet exercised due care in providing
individual and team training for the newly assembled crew, one
would have to examine the crew rest logs and interview
individual crew members to determine the accuracy of those logs.
Particularly on this "maiden" voyage for the new crew, it seems
doubtful that the master and mates received the minimum rest
163. Arguments seeking to shift responsibility for the spill to others, such as the
pilot, the Coast Guard Captain of the Port for failing to "close" the port or the Vessel
Traffic Service for a failure to take control of the vessel are not relevant to the
question whether Fleet, as the vessel operator, negligently caused the discharge of oil
into San Francisco Bay. The pilot, escort tug, port authorities and VTS were not the
risk-creating activities in this case. They were external risk management measures,
which a vessel may choose to employ in its overall approach to managing the risk.
There may well be other causes of the spill, some of which might be relevant to the
company's civil liability, but they will not excuse a vessel owner's or operator's
causative fault, except in the rare case where those acts constituted a superseding
cause.
164. Recognizing that liability and hull insurers have a substantial measure of
influence over shipowner and operator practices, one would hope that the conduct of
the Germanischer Lloyd classification society surveyor in issuing the Cosco Busan a
Safety Management System certificate on October 25, 2007, will be considered by
hull insurers and protection and indemnity associations in rating the professional
competency of the organization.
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required by the STCW Code. 165 It is well known that crew fatigue
seriously undermines crew performance and, therefore, ship
safety. A crew short on rest is also much less likely to spend
precious off-watch time reading the necessary manuals.
4. FAILURE TO EXERCISE DUE CARE IN SUPERVISING
THE VESSEL'S NAVIGATION PLANNING
Pre-departure navigation planning is an integral component
of safe ship operations. The minimum detail is set out in the
standards for berth-to-berth planning incorporated into the
governing international instruments and in the "company's" own
manuals. Reasonable care calls for greater detail in planning
where the crew will be navigating in unfamiliar waters, restricted
or congested waters and where prevailing weather conditions
may affect navigation or ship operations. Fleet's on-board marine
superintendent knew or had reason to know the ship lacked any
kind of passage plan at the time it departed Busan for California.
He knew or had reason to know that the plan prepared several
days later was a pilot-to-pilot plan that did not extend to the
internal waters of the port of LA/Long Beach. He knew or had
reason to know that it also lacked a berth-to-berth passage plan
for the inbound or outbound transits for San Francisco Bay.
These omissions, all of which occurred while Fleet's
superintendent was aboard, violated SOLAS and the STCW, and
it likely violated Fleet's own guidance manuals. Therefore, the
superintendent knew or had ample reason to know that neither
the master nor the navigator (ie. second mate) was carrying out
their obligations for navigation planning. Yet, despite the
presence of an on-board superintendent, Fleet took no steps to
correct its employees' omissions until after the allision.
The importance of this omission and the danger it created
can only be appreciated by studying the components of a
compliant berth-to-berth passage plan. Such a plan, prepared by
the navigator/second mate and approved by the master, will
include plotted tracklines and waypoints for turns, to inform the
other members of the bridge team. The passage plan is also a key
component of the master-pilot exchange. Without tracklines and
waypoints the bridge team has no means of complying with the
U.S. Navigation Safety Regulations or backing up the pilot's
165. See, e.g., STCW Code, supra note 110, section A-VIII/1 (requiring 10 hours of
rest in any 24 hour period, such rest divided into no more than 2 periods, one of
which must be at least 6 hours long). See also id. at section B-VIII/i1.
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navigation, as the STCW requires. But passage planning requires
much more-particularly when the visibility may be severely
restricted. Without a passage plan for the transit between the
Oakland estuary and the San Francisco sea buoy, the ship could
do little more than blindly rely on the pilot, who could not see
beyond the vessel's bow at the time of the allision. The cost of
such sole reliance on the pilot has been well known since 1980,
when the Summit Venture allided with the Sunshine Skyway
Bridge.
5. FAILURE TO EXERCISE DUE CARE IN ASSIGNING
SUFFICIENT NAVIGATION WATCH PERSONNEL
FOR RESTRICTED WATERS
The evidence suggests Fleet breached its duty to exercise
reasonable care in prescribing the Cosco Busan's bridge
navigation watch organization for restricted waters. By designing
a watch organization that put only one mate and the master on
the bridge during this critical stage, Fleet virtually ensured that
the vessel could not possibly comply with the U.S. Navigation
Safety Regulations,166 the STCW Code' 67 or the company's own
requirement to take and plot fixes every five minutes. The third
mate, who was assigned as the bridge watch officer, had at least
three different duties, including operating the engine controls,
which is a function that an able seaman, serving as the "lee
helmsman" can do, suggesting a need to assign an additional
rating (i.e., an able seaman) or even an officer, perhaps the ship's
navigator, who was assigned to the ship's fantail, to the restricted
waters bridge team. Evidence revealed that throughout the entire
in-bound transit to the pier in Oakland the third mate was able to
take only one or two fixes. It was negligent to operate with an
inadequate bridge team during the in-bound transit; it was
reckless to use exactly the same inadequate bridge team in near
zero visibility, when electronic navigation would be
indispensable.
Through its on-board superintendent, Fleet knew or had
reason to know that bridge staffing was inadequate in restricted
waters. And if the bridge team staffing was inadequate for the
166. See 33 C.F.R. § 164.11 (2011).
167. See STCW Code, supra note 110, section A-V111/2, para. 47 (requiring fixes at
"frequent intervals" using more than one means of navigation whenever
circumstances allow). See also id. at para. 49 (requiring the ship's crew to maintain
an accurate check on the ship's position and movement).
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tasks required during such a transit in clear visibility, a fortiori it
was inadequate when the visibility prevented those on the bridge
from seeing beyond the ship's own bow.
6. FAILURE TO EXERCISE DUE CARE IN SUPERVISING
EXECUTION OF NAVIGATION PLANS AND PROCEDURES
As the vessel's operator, Fleet's duty extended beyond the
obligation to hire a competent master and crew, to train them and
to effectively implement its ISM Code-required SMS. It also had a
duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising its employee-crew
members. In evaluating the practicalities of a ship operator
supervising its master crew, it is noteworthy that in this case
Fleet had a unique advantage because it had at least one
superintendent aboard the ship from the time it left Busan until
shortly before it sailed from the Oakland terminal. Presumably
with full knowledge of the required procedures in the company's
safety manuals and the international standards they
incorporated, Fleet's marine superintendent passively looked on
as the ship repeatedly violated the requirements for passage
planning. The superintendent had actual or constructive
knowledge that the bridge team did not take, plot, cross-check
and record fixes in those waters at five minute intervals and after
every change of course during the in-bound transit, and to report
the ship's position to the person directing its movement, the pilot
and the master, as the NSRs and manuals required. And Fleet's
superintendent knew or should have known the bridge team was
inadequate to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the company's
manuals or the U.S. Navigation Safety Requirements-even in
clear weather, as the in-bound transit demonstrated.
VII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Department of Justice and Coast Guard are
committed to ensuring the integrity of all components of the
"vessel safety net," including the vessel owner and operator. The
fact that any number of negligent acts on board a vessel may
cause an oil discharge provides them with ample opportunities to
scrutinize the owner's and operator's conduct and punish vessel
negligence, in order to protect the nation's marine environment.
Prosecutors have considerable discretion in determining whether
to initiate a criminal action in such cases. The U.S. Attorney's
Manual cautions "it may not be appropriate to impose liability
upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust compliance
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program in place, under a strict respondeat superior theory for
the single isolated act of a rogue employee." 168 However, where
there is evidence supporting direct corporate criminality, or
where the corporation obstructs the investigation, a prosecutor is
more likely to initiate a criminal prosecution against the
corporation. Violations of codes that assign duties directly to the
company operating the vessel will increasingly provide the
necessary evidence of direct corporate criminality.
Most seasoned mariners would readily conclude that the
voyage of the Cosco Busan was a disaster in waiting from the
moment the ship sailed for California with its newly arrived and
assembled crew. The risk factors were manifest before the Cosco
Busan left the safety of the Oakland terminal. Those risk factors
would have been obvious to Fleet's superintendent before he
departed the vessel in Oakland. The vessel's master and crew-
who had already seen the company's superintendent take no
action when they sailed from Busan without the required passage
plan-knew from the start where the company's true priorities
were.
Tapes from the vessel's VDR indicated the bridge team knew
the risk of sailing in restricted waters in dense fog was
extraordinarily high. Yet no effectively implemented company
SMS told the crew to exercise independent judgment and either
instruct the pilot that the ship would delay its departure until
visibility improved, as four other ships did that morning, or
discuss additional risk management measures that could be put
in place to bring the risk level within prudent limits. A
reasonably prudent shipowner would take steps to ensure that
the master never relied solely on a pilot's judgment regarding
risk of getting underway in near zero visibility. No special
knowledge of pilot waters is needed to make that risk
management decision. Indeed, the situation is the same whether
made in San Francisco, Shanghai or Southampton, and should be
made by the master, in accordance with the company's ISM-
compliant safety management policy.
As the operator for a 900 foot vessel trading in international
commerce, Fleet had a duty to do more than merely deliver thick
binders containing an elaborate Safety Management System. It
was required to implement that system and to monitor
168. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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compliance with the system by taking reasonable steps to ensure
its master and crew understood and carried out their duties
respecting safe navigation of the vessel. Its on-board
superintendents provided it with a real and continuing ability to
do so. Finally, any argument that, because Fleet had only taken
over as manager of the vessel a short time before the incident,
less safety management oversight was possible, must be flatly
rejected. Changes in owners, charterers or operators call for
greater care during the transition period, and such transitions
must never be accepted as a justification for failing to exercise
reasonable care. Part of any compliant SMS is a clear line of
authority, responsibility and, therefore, accountability. In this
case a foreign flag vessel was sent to California by an operator
who failed to build in adequate time to effectively implement its
SMS or ensure the master and crew were trained in the
operator's policies and procedures. The situation may have been
aggravated by the complex organization of owners, operators and
managers, which muddied accountability and responsibility. A
company's business decision to erect or reshuffle a complex
corporate organization to serve its commercial ends and to
dispatch its newly-acquired ship with almost no transition time
for the new crew can never be accepted as an excuse for
temporarily relaxing the requirement to exercise due care.
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